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Courts across many common law democracies have
been wrestling with a shared predicament: proving
cases against suspected terrorists in detention hearings requires governments to protect sensitive classified information about intelligence sources and methods, but withholding evidence from suspects
threatensfairness and contradicts a basic tenet of adversarialprocess. This Article examines several models for resolving this problem, including the "special
advocate" model employed by Britain and Canada,
and the 'Judicial management" model employed in
Israel. This analysis shows how the very different approaches adopted even among democracies sharing
common legalfoundations reflect varying understandings of 'fundamentalfairness" or "due process, " and
their effectiveness in each system depends on the special institutionalfeatures of each national court system. This Article examines the secret evidence dilemma in a manner relevant to foreseeable reforms in the
United States, as courts and Congress wrestle with
questions left open by Boumediene v. Bush.
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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Boumediene v.
Bush guarantees Guantanamo detainees a constitutional right to a
meaningful opportunity to challenge detention in court, but it leaves
open significant substantive and procedural questions.' One of those
open questions is how to handle the issue of classified evidence and
the dangers of disclosing such information to a suspected terrorist de-

1. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008). While mandating that Guantanamo detainees
receive access to U.S. federal courts empowered to correct errors after "meaningful review
of both the cause for detention and the Executive's power to detain," id. at 2269, the Court
made clear that it was "not address[ing] the content of the law that governs petitioners'
detention." Id. at 2277.
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tainee 2-an issue the Chief Justice, in his dissent joined by three others, sharply criticizes the majority for failing to address. 3 This Article helps to fill this gap, by evaluating and comparing several alternatives to deal with the challenge of secret evidence.
The secret evidence predicament pits fairness against security.
Consider, for example, a detention hearing for an al Qaida suspect in
which key information against him comes from a highly-placed informant inside the terrorist organization or from a foreign intelligence service whose government cannot afford politically to acknowledge continuing support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. This
information may be crucial to the government's case, but disclosing
it to the suspect could damage critical ongoing intelligence operations and cooperation. How should courts manage this problem?
In the wake of Boumediene, then-Attorney General Michael
Mukasey admonished Congress "to resolve the difficult questions left
open by the Supreme Court ...[and to] ensure that the proceedings
mandated by the Supreme Court are conducted in a responsible and
prompt way and, as the Court itself urged, in a practical way."' 4
[It is imperative that the proceedings for these enemy
combatants be conducted in a way that protects how
our Nation gathers intelligence, and what that intelligence is .... We simply cannot afford to reveal to terrorists all that we know about them and how we acquired that information. We need to protect our
national security secrets, and we can do so in a way
that is fair to both the Government and detainees
5
alike.
2. See id. at 2276 ("We recognize ... that the Government has a legitimate interest in
protecting sources and methods of intelligence gathering; and we expect that the District
Court will use its discretion to accommodate this interest to the greatest extent possible.");
see also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) ("The government has a compelling interest
in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the
appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign
intelligence service.") (internal quotations omitted).
3. 128 S.Ct. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("If the Court can design a better
system for communicating to detainees the substance of any information relevant to their
cases, without fatally compromising national security interests and sources, the majority
should come forward with it. Instead, the majority fobs that vexing question off on district
courts to answer down the road.").
4. Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.
justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/July/08-opa-633.html).
5. Id. Prior to becoming Attorney General, then retired-judge Mukasey raised similar
concerns about disclosure of classified information to terrorists through criminal litigation.
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Meanwhile, several other common law democracies as well
as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have been wrestling
with the same issue in similar contexts. Recently, the ECHR, which
was called to review British legislation on detentions of suspected
terrorists, acknowledged in this context that not all the relevant evidence must be disclosed (although it insisted on some level of disclosure, as detailed below). 6 Based on that decision, the British House
of Lords then unanimously ruled that under article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (which guarantees a right to a fair trial), terrorism suspects facing serious liberty deprivation are entitled
'7
to disclosure of at least "the essence of the case against [them]."
This Article draws on experience in the United Kingdom,
Canada, Israel and the United States to identify and compare several
models for handling classified information relied upon to support a
decision to detain long-term a suspected terrorist outside of the criminal justice system. It finds a common reliance among all these systems on a baseline requirement that a suspect be told at least the
"core" or "gist" of allegations against him. Beyond that baseline requirement, however, the systems-which share common roots-have
adopted varying supplemental mechanisms. One, found in Israel, is a
judicial management approach emphasizing robust court scrutiny of
secret evidence, similar to that used in inquisitorial legal systems. A
second, found in the United Kingdom and Canada, is the creation of
special advocates, or government attorneys charged with representing
the detainee's interests with respect to secret evidence.
This Article aims to show how these different institutional or
procedural approaches among common law democracies reflect different understandings about the role of judges and also different emphases among various due process values, especially fairness versus
decision-making accuracy. As a normative matter, we aim to build a
more complete analytic framework than currently exists to evaluate
E.g. Michael B. Mukasey, Jose PadillaMakes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at
A15.
6. A. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 203 (2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=847470&portal=hbk
m&source=extemalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0 1C 1166DEA39869
(noting the "requirement of procedural fairness under Article 5 § 4 does not impose a
uniform, unvarying standard to be applied irrespective of the context, facts and
circumstances"); id. para. 220 (holding that where open material was only general assertions
and the decision was based on closed materials, the requirements of Art. 5 of the Convention
would not be met).
7. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept. v. AF [2009] UKHL 28, para. 65 (Lord Phillips).
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and compare the various models. We argue that the merits of doctrinal or institutional devices for handling secret evidence cannot be
fully understood in isolation of other institutional features, because
they often operate in combination-sometimes reinforcing each other
but sometimes pushing against each other. Furthermore, the relative
merits of the various approaches should be understood not only in
terms of their effectiveness in regulating individual case adjudication,
but also in terms of their systemic regulation of detention regimes
and the state powers that underlie them. This analysis points to several lessons that should guide legal reform in the United States.
Methodologically, this is not meant to provide a comprehensive survey of jurisprudence in any of the systems we analyze. Rather, we draw on examples to illustrate several possible models, the
comparison of which yields useful insights to guide legal reform. We
exclude from our analysis the use of secret evidence in criminal trials
for several reasons. 8 First, national criminal law often contains specific constraints on the use of secret evidence that do not apply in
other administrative procedures that threaten liberty. For example,
the U.S. Constitution mandates that criminal defendants be able to
confront witnesses against them. 9 Second, criminal justice is generally designed to favor overwhelmingly the avoidance of "false positives" over "false negatives," i.e. conviction of the innocent over letting guilty free,1 0 whereas terrorism detention sometimes requires a
different balance. 1 It is that latter flexibility that we wish to explore
across several models with a common baseline of "due process" or
"fundamental fairness" and sharing common foundational traditions.
Third, administrative (non-criminal) detentions are not supposed to
serve as alternatives to criminal trials, but rather to be used for preventive purposes. In fact, in some systems that use such detentions
they are considered an option that should not be relied upon when it
is possible to bring charges regarding past events, based on admissi8. For discussion of this matter in the criminal context, see

SERRIN TURNER &

STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN TERRORISM TRIALS

(Brennan Center for

Justice 2005).

9. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. No wonder that the famous "J'accuse!" by Emile Zola referred, among other
accusations, to the use of secret evidence in the infamous Dreyfus trial: "Finally, I accuse
the first court-martial of violating the law by convicting the accused on the basis of a
document that was kept secret, and I accuse the second court-martial of covering up this
illegality, on orders, thus committing the judicial crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty
man." Emile Zola, JAccuse .. ! Lettre au Prisidentde la R~publique, L'AURoRE, Jan. 13,
1898.
11. See Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and
Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (2008).
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ble evidence. 12 It is worth noting that the possibility of using secret
evidence (and the controversy around it) may arise also in related
areas which do not involve detention, such as freezing of assets of
people who are suspected as aiding terrorist-related activity. 13
Nor is this Article a complete account of all possible approaches to secret evidence, including an absolutist position against
its use altogether.' 4 This Article takes as given a normative assump-

12. For example, according to section 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2
(U.K.), "[b]efore making, or applying for the making of, a control order against the
individual, the Secretary of State must consult the chief officer of the police force about
whether there is evidence available that could realistically be used for the purposes of a
prosecution of the individual for an offence relating to terrorism," id. § 8(2), and "[i]t shall
then be the duty of the chief officer to secure that the investigation of the individual's
conduct with a view to his prosecution for an offence relating to terrorism is kept under
review throughout the period during which the control order has effect," id. § 8(4).
Similarly, one of the criteria used by the Israeli Supreme Court when reviewing the
justification for administrative detentions has been the possibility to bring criminal charges
against the detained individual. See, e.g., HCJ 5784/03 Salama v. Commander of IDF Forces
in Judea and Samaria [2003] 57(6) IrSC 721, 726 ("[I]t is preferable to take criminal steps
against someone suspected of hostile activity of a security nature, rather than use the
procedure of administrative detention. In criminal proceedings the defendant, suspected of
terror activity ... can confront the evidence brought against him, a defense that is sometimes
not possible in administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that for
reasons of protecting intelligence sources, it s not always possible to use criminal
proceedings.") (citation omitted).
13. The main example in this regard is the Kadi decision of the ECJ, which ruled
against the possibility of freezing assets of individuals who were included in a list of people
who aid terrorist activity (according to Security Council Resolutions, starting from Security
Council Resolution 1267 from 1999), and were actually denied the possibility of a hearing,
based on arguments regarding evidence in their matter. See Joined Cases C-402P and C415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council of the European
Union and Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 2008 E.C.R. 1-6351. Moreover, one of the
recent adjustments introduced into the UN regime of freezing assets directs, when a name is
added to the list,
to make accessible on the Committee's website a narrative summary of reasons
for listing for the corresponding entry or entries on the Consolidated List, further directs the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in
coordination with the relevant designating States, to make accessible on the
Committee's website narrative summaries of reasons for listing for entries that
were added to the Consolidated List before the date of adoption of this resolution.
S.C. Res. 1822, 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008).
14. See generally JUSTICE, SECRET EVIDENCE 213-35 (June 2009), http://
www.justice.org.uk/publications/listofpublications/index.htm (using the find function, find
"secret evidence"; then follow the highlighted "Secret Evidence" link) (calling for an end to
the use of secret evidence in British proceedings). "This report calls for an end to the use of
secret evidence. Secret evidence is unreliable, unfair, undemocratic, unnecessary and
damaging to both national security and the integrity of Britain's courts." Id. at 5.
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tive need to balance fairness and secrecy in some contexts and focuses on mechanisms for administering and enforcing that balance.
Part II describes the foundational principles common to all of
the systems studied and how they give rise to a shared, minimum disclosure requirement. It then examines two competing models for
supplementing that baseline requirement, Israel's judicial management and the United Kingdom and Canada's special advocates. Part
III compares these competing models. It cautions that both models
risk undermining the baseline disclosure requirements they are designed in part to protect, and it argues that the choice between models
reflects differing priorities among the values of "fairness." Part IV
applies these insights to ongoing debates about detention law in the
United States and argues that choices for handling secret evidence
should be considered in the context of other institutional features.
II.

DUE PROCESS AND

SECRET EVIDENCE:

A BASELINE AND Two

MODELS

All the systems reviewed in this paper share the common law
tradition,1 5 adhere to adversarial process and acknowledge an understanding of fairness based on disclosure of relevant evidential materials to the person involved. Accordingly, they all accept as a starting
point the duty to disclose at least the "core" of the accusation against
a suspect facing deprivation of liberty by the state. The differences
emerge when these systems define the minimum level of this core,
and the procedures adopted to compensate for situations which do not
allow for complete disclosure.
A.

The Core/GistRequirement as a Baseline

Each system discussed in this paper shares a baseline requirement that, at minimum, a summary or core of the evidence
against an individual in an administrative decision be disclosed. The
requirement of core disclosure serves to ensure that the individual
concerned has adequate notice of the case against him, and has an
opportunity to rebut the government's allegations. National security
15. Formally speaking, Israeli law is considered a "mixed legal system," which has
been shaped by both the common law tradition and continental legislation, but in fact,
despite many instances of legislation borrowed from Europe, the foundations of the legal
culture are common law oriented. See generally Daphne Barak-Erez, Codification and
Legal Culture: In ComparativePerspective, 13 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 125 (1998).
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concerns, especially those implicated in contemporary counterterrorism policy, strain this traditional baseline protection.
1.

Natural Justice and Disclosure Requirements

Common law traditions of due process generally find their
roots in the concept of "natural justice" as developed in English administrative law. This concept included two major procedural requirements regarding administrative decisions that threaten liberty:
that an individual be given a proper opportunity to be heard-and to
this end should be given due notice of the hearing as well as adequate
notice of the evidence against him-and that the decision maker be
disinterested and unbiased. 16
For the purposes of this paper, the relevant aspect of natural
justice is the right to be heard as developed at common law. At
present, the English and other European courts apply this concept of
fairness also with reference to section 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, which states that "in the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law." 17
One of the goals of the embedded duty of notice is to give the
individual who might be affected by an administrative act an effective opportunity to prepare his own case regarding that act, answer
any arguments that might be brought up against him and test the
quality of the government's evidence. As explained by British Lord
Denning in Kanda v. Government of Malaya: "[The accused] must
know what evidence has been given and what statements have been
made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to
correct or contradict them."' 8 Indeed, if any allegations are to be
made against an individual by an administrative authority, that person
is typically entitled to know the particulars of those allegations, as
16. See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 440-45 (9th
ed. 2004); see also JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 14-28 (describing historical development of
these natural justice principles). The JUSTICE report, for example, quotes Francis Bacon in
1826: "[For injustice it is plain, and cannot be denied, that we hear but the one part:
whereas the rule audi alterampartem is not of the formality, but the essence of justice." Id.
at 15.
17. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, preamble, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222

[hereinafter ECHR] (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
18. Kanda v. Gov't of Malaya [1962] 1 A.C. 322 (P.C. 1962) (appeal taken from the
Federated Malay States).

2009]

SECRET EVIDENCE

well as the body of evidence employed by the authority in its decision-making process, so as to allow him to effectively answer those
allegations and refute any prejudicial evidence. This is sometimes
referred to as the administrative authority's duty of adequate disclosure 19 or as the individual's right to see adverse evidence. In the
United Kingdom, a failure to meet the duty of adequate disclosure by
the authority traditionally establishes a prima facie presumption of
20
procedural unfairness.
2.

Balancing Disclosure with Public Interest: The Core/Gist
Approach

The general rule of disclosure has some limits, such as in cases where disclosure might be harmful to the public interest. 21 However, even when such conflicting interests arise, "the person claiming
to be aggrieved should nevertheless be adequately apprised of the
case he has to answer, subject to the need for withholding details in
order to protect overriding interests. '2 2 Where the statutory framework limits the duty of disclosure, due to conflicting interests, the requirements of natural justice may still be met "by telling [the adversely affected person] the substance of the case he has to meet,
without disclosing the precise evidence or the sources of informa23
tion."
In R. v. Gaming Boardfor Great Britain, a case challenging
the British Gaming Board's licensing procedures as violating principles of natural justice, the Court of Appeals (Lord Denning M.R.)
explained that even though much of the information and evidence
employed by the board in its licensing procedure must remain confidential, since revealing that information or the sources that provided
it may be contrary to public interest, "[the board] must let [the applicant] know what their impressions are so that he can disabuse
them. '24 Lord Denning added that: "[W]ithout disclosing every detail, I should have thought that the board ought in every case to be
able to give to the applicant sufficient indication of the objections

19.

LORD WOOLF ET AL.,

DE SMITH WOOLF & JOWELL'S PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW 312, 323 (5th ed. 1999).

20. Id. at 324.
21. Id. at 326.
22. Id. at 327.
23. WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 16, at 516.
24.

(C.A.).

Gaming Bd. for Great Britain v. R. ex parte Benjamin, [1970] 2 Q.B. 417, 430
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raised against him such as to enable him to answer them. ' 25 As such,
full disclosure is not mandated, but the individual concerned must be
informed of a core of information sufficient to enable a rebuttal to the
charges against him.
In the United States, discussion of principles of natural justice
is guised under an analysis of due process of law, the essential requirements of which track natural justice: "notice and an opportunity
to respond. '26 Before the modem evolution of due process doctrine,
the U.S. Supreme Court in a number of cases required that the core of
the evidence against an individual be disclosed to him. For example,
in Simmons v. United States27 the Supreme Court held that in an appeal to the Department of Justice of a decision to deny an individual's conscientious objector claim, a gist of the facts proffered by the
government must be supplied to the individual. The Court noted the
2' 8
importance of balancing secrecy with "the demands of faimess"
explaining that the government need not disclose its full report "because we [are] of the view that other safeguards in the proceeding,
particularly the furnishing
of a fair r6sum6, maintain[s] the basic
' 29
elements of fair play.
This "core" or "gist" requirement has been reinforced in its
use in immigration proceedings. For example, in R. v. Home Secretary ex parte Fayed, a British case challenging the naturalization procedure that permitted the rejection of an applicant's petition for naturalization based on undisclosed considerations, Lord Woolf stated
that:
[It is not required] that the Secretary of State do more
than to identify the subject of his concern in such
terms as to enable the applicant to make such submissions as he can. In some situations even to do this
25. Id. at 431.
26. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
27. 348 U.S. 397 (1955). Note that this case took place well before American
procedural due process doctrine shifted dramatically in such cases as Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
the latter of which is discussed, infra, at notes 198, 212 and accompanying text. In Roth, the

Court required an initial showing that the government had "deprived" an individual either of
liberty or some positive-law based entitled that sufficed to "trigger" due process protections.
In the present context, we do not address the procedural due process trigger issue, because
the focus is on patent executive deprivations of liberty, and instead focus exclusively on the
doctrinal issue of what process is then due.
28. Id. at 403.
29. Id. See also Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955) (holding that in a
conscientious objector prosecution, the individual was entitled to know the gist of the Justice
Department's report in order to be afforded an opportunity to reply).
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could involve disclosing matters which it is not in the
public interest to disclose, for example for national security or diplomatic reasons. If this is the position
then the Secretary of State would be relieved from
disclosure and it would suffice if he merely indicated
that this was the position to the applicant who ...
the justification for the refusal before
could challenge
30
the courts.
to the
The Court quashed the decisions of the Home Secretary due 31
Sifailure to disclose even the "gist of matters" to the applicants.
milarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Chiarelliv. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), a case concerning the sufficiency
of the evidence provided to an alien in his deportation proceedings,
ruled that the government need not give extensive details of the case
against him. 32 In the Court's view, no injustice occurred so long as
substance
an individual received "sufficient information to know the
'33
respond.
to
able
be
to
and
him,
of the allegations against
These cases illustrate that even in instances where disclosure
of information may impair the public's interest, a core of information
must still be disclosed to an individual. The use of the core is a flexible means by which courts can balance the interest of the individual
concerned with broader public interests that may be implicated in the
disclosure of the government's information.
The core requirement functions as a means to ensure a fair
playing field between the individual and the government. For example, in Roberts v. ParoleBoard, the House of Lords recognized that
the use of a special advocate, a concept described below, cannot be a
replacement for knowledge of the case against an individual. 34 Lord
Woolf warned that the special advocate procedure, which had yet to
be used at the hearing, might not be a sufficient replacement for the

30.
(C.A.).

R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Sec'y ex parte Fayed, [1997] 1 All ER. 228, 241

31.

Id. at 242; WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 16, at 517; see also Lazarov v. Sec'y of

State of Canada, [1973] F.C. 927 (Can.) (noting that in the citizenship determination process
an individual must be given privy to the allegations against him to "an extent sufficient to
enable to him to respond to them and he must have a fair opportunity to dispute or explain
them").
32.

Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711.

33.

Id. at 746, para. 52.

34.

R. (on the application of Roberts) v. Parole Bd. [2005] UKHL 45, para. 60, [2005]

2 A.C. 738, 776 (Lord Woolf); see also Sec'y of State for the Home v. M.B. [2007] UKHL
46, para. 35, [2008] 1 A.C. 440, 479 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (agreeing with Lord Woolf
in Roberts v. ParoleBoard).
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"core, irreducible, minimum entitlement" 35 that an individual is owed
in order to challenge any evidence which decisively weighs on the
legality of his detention. Lord Woolf explained:
If a case arises where it is impossible for the board
both to make use of information that has not been disclosed to the prisoner and, at the same time, protect
the prisoner from a denial of his fundamental right to a
fair hearing then the rights of the prisoner have to take
precedence ...36
In order to satisfy the prisoner's fundamental right to a fair hearing,
however, Lord Woolf added, reinforcing the primacy of the gist of
information to the calculation, that "if the board comes to a decision
in favour of the prisoner or reveals at least the gist of the case against
the offender, then there may be no injustice to the prisoner ....
In the United States, the failure to provide adequate disclosure
has also been viewed as a contravention of fairness. In Joint AntiFascistRefugee Committee v. McGrath the Supreme Court ruled that
the Attorney General acted outside the scope of his power by designating organizations as Communist without any process of reasoning. 38 Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion referred to principles
of natural justice in concluding that petitioners were owed due
process by the government in making determinations of Communist
designations: "The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy;
a democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of
facts decisive of rights. '39
3.

Terrorist Detention and the Core/Gist Approach

These concepts become more challenging when they are applied in the context of national security. The British House of Lords
was faced with the issue of disclosure of information in this context

35.

Roberts, [2005] UKHL 45, para. 68, [2005] 2 A.C. at 779.

36. Id. para. 78, at 781-82 (Lord Woolf).
37.

Id. para. 83, at 783. Similarly in R. v. Secretaryof State for the Home Department,

ex parte Duggan, the Queen's Bench Division concluded that in determinations of a
prisoner's security risk level, "fairness . . . requires that the gist of the reports be revealed."
[1994] 3 All E.R. 277, 288 (Q.B.).
38. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Note, again,

that this case long pre-dates modem due process doctrine. See supra note 27.
39. Id. at 170.
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when it had to review decisions to mandate liberty restrictions against
suspected terrorists. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the British Government is authorized to issue control orders, 40 which are
akin to issuances of home arrest for part of the day, and place 4limitations on the liberty of individuals suspected of being terrorists. '
British courts have recently had occasion to examine whether
these control orders can survive refusals to disclose critical information to suspects in the name of significant national security interests.
The House of Lords confronted this difficulty in the watershed case
of Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB. 42 The case
concerned control orders imposed on two individuals, on the grounds
of their suspected involvement with Islamist extremists. Both orders
were based on evidence not disclosed to the appellants or their legal
representatives. It is not clear from the language of the opinions
whether the Law Lords indeed required an irreducible core requirement to be disclosed to MB and AF. The Lords held that a trial judge
may have a control order quashed if he/she determines that the hearing was ultimately unfair 43-leaving for another day whether a hearing without a core of disclosed information might in some cases be
fair.
There are suggestions in the decision that could be interpreted
as a willingness to recognize the possibility of complete nondisclosure. 44 The analysis is complicated by the process of judicial
review in the context of control orders, which includes the option of
disclosure to a special advocate who represents the controlled person,
but not to him (as explained below). Accordingly, Lord Carswell
stated:
There is a very wide spectrum of cases in which
closed material is relied on by the Secretary of State.
40. Britain has chosen to manage the threat of terrorism without full detention powers
granted by Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, after the
House of Lords ruled in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71,

[2006] 2 A.C. 221, that the application of Part 4 violated the United Kingdom's
commitments under the European Convention. The result was a legislative reform in which
the British Parliament enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2.
41. Limitations on liberty include, for example, curfews, limitations on travel and
associations and requirements to check in with government authorities. See Prevention of
Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 1(4)(d)-(f), (p).
42. [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 A.C. 440.

43. Id. paras. 69-70, at 490 (Baroness Hale).
44.

See id. para. 74, at 492 (Baroness Hale) ("It is quite possible for the court to

provide the controlled person a sufficient measure of procedural protection even though the
whole evidential basis for the basic allegation, which has been explained to him, is not
disclosed.").
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At one extreme there may be cases in which the sole
evidence adverse to the controlee is closed material,
he cannot be told what the evidence is or even given
its gist and the special advocate is not in a position to
take sufficient instructions to mount an effective challenge to the adverse allegations. At the other end
there may be cases where the probative effect of the
closed material is very slight or merely corroborative
of strong open material and there is no obstacle to presenting a defence. There is an infinite variety of possible cases in between. The balance between the open
material and the closed material and the probative nature of each will vary from case to case. 45
This emerging vagueness around the gist concept, which previously
seemed relatively clear, is intensified in decisions based on this leading judgment, as indicated by the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF.46 Here the
court interpreted the decision in MB as leaving open the possibility of
complete non-disclosure in certain cases. The judgment states that,
[t]here is no principle that a hearing will be unfair in
the absence of open disclosure to the controlee of an
irreducible minimum of allegation or evidence. Alternatively, if there is, the irreducible can, depending on
the circumstances, be met by disclosure of as little information as was provided in AF, which is very little
47
indeed.
However, more recently the European Court of Human Rights
and the House of Lords have reaffirmed that even within the context
of national security, the gist remains an irreplaceable measure of protection. The European Court of Human Rights examined the issue of
secret evidence in its decision in A. and Others v. United Kingdom. 48
There the applicants challenged the procedure used to determine the
legality of their detention, especially the lack of disclosure of evi45. Id. para. 85, at 496 (Lord Carswell).
46. [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1148, [2009] 2 W.L.R. 423 (U.K.).
47. Id. para. 64, at 455.
48. A. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.
int/tkp 197/view.asp?action=html&documentld=847470&portal=hbkm&source=extemalbyd
ocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0 1C 1166DEA398649. This decision is interesting
not only for its examination of the procedural fairness of the special advocate system, but
also for its determinations regarding preventative detentions under the European Convention
on Human Rights.
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dence. 49 The United Kingdom at this time employed special advocates to assist an individual facing detention where the government
relied on secret evidence. The Court held that while special advocates were a useful procedural protection, 50 they were not a substitute
for the disclosure of the core of the evidence against an individual.
Therefore, in some cases "[w]here ...the open material consisted
purely of general assertions and [the court's] decision to uphold the
certification and maintain the detention was based solely or to a decisive degree on closed materials, the procedural requirements of [the
Convention] would not be satisfied."' 51 The Court held that in a
number of individual cases, the Convention's right to a fair trial had
been violated. 52 It appears that, at least under the European Convention, the requirement of a core disclosure if one is facing detention
remains required for a hearing to be fair.
Based on this decision of the European Court of Human
Rights, the British House of Lords overruled its prior decision and
unanimously held that, pursuant to the European Convention, a defendant facing a control order has a right to disclosure of at least
"sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable
him to give effective instructions" to the special advocate. 53 "The
Grand Chamber has now made clear," writes Lord Phillips, "that
non-disclosure cannot go so far as to deny a party knowledge of the
essence of the case against him, at least where he is at risk of consequences as severe as those normally imposed under a control order." 54

49. Id. para. 214.
50. Id. para. 220.
51. Id.
52. Id. paras. 223-24.
53. Sec'y of State v. AF [2009] UKHL 28, para. 59. Following these rulings at least
two individuals subject to control orders have had them revoked by the Secretary of State,
Frances Gibb, Top terror suspect is freed over secretsfear, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Sept. 7,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 17526352; Alan Travis, Terror Suspect FreedAfter Home
Secretary Revokes Second Control Order, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 2009, available at

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/sep/24/control-order-revoked -imam-ae, and a court
has released another, Sec 'y of State for the Home Dep 't v. O'Connor [2009] EWHC (Admin)

1966, para. 3 (noting that "non-disclosure has gone so far as to deny AN knowledge of the
essence of the case against him. The essence of that case has now been withdrawn. It
therefore follows that the decision of the Secretary of State was made upon grounds upon
which no reliance can now be placed."). The media reported that the Secretary of State
released the two individuals because the government would be unable to prove the grounds
for the control orders without jeopardizing state secrets. See Gibb, supra; Travis, supra.
54. Sec'y of State v. AF [2009] UKHL 28, para. 65.
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A tentative lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that the
very basic core/gist requirement comes under tremendous pressure as
the public interest stakes against information disclosure rise in national security cases. 55 Against this background, supplementary
models have been introduced in several common law systems to meet
the challenge of procedural fairness in national security contexts.
B.

The JudicialManagementModel

One model for improving on the core/gist baseline is found in
Israeli law, which permits administrative detention of certain individuals considered threats to national security, subject to judicial review. 56 As in the case of British control orders, the key question becomes what specific kind of judicial review adequately safeguards
fairness when national security imperatives dictate nondisclosure of
information. As explained below, judges in Israel have developed an
approach in a number of detention contexts which we label the "judicial management model."
1.

The Statutory Scheme

Israel inherited provisions allowing for administrative detentions for security reasons from the pre-independence legal system
governing British Mandatory Palestine, as enacted in the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945. 57 This regime was later replaced
by a new law-the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979which, while preserving the possibility of preventive administrative
detentions, afforded greater procedural safeguards. 58 According to
the 1979 law:

55. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System:
CIPA and FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063 (2006) (arguing that providing the

gist of secret evidence undermines the integrity and effectiveness of adversarial process).
56. On the Israeli detention law system, see generally Mara Rudman & Mazen Qupty,
The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law: Israel's Courts Have a Mission-Should They
Choose to Accept It?, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 469 (1990).

57. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 Palestine Gazette no. 1442, Supp. No. 2,
at 1055.
58. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5739-1979, 33 LSI 89 (1979) (Isr.)
[hereinafter, Israeli Detentions Law]. For a brief review of the history of administrative
detention legislation in Israel, see paragraph 6 of Justice Rubinstein's opinion in HCJ
9441/07 Agbar v. I.D.F. Commander in Judea & Samaria [2007] (not published).
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Where the Minister of Defence has reasonable cause
to believe that reasons of state security or public security require that a particular person be detained, he
may, by order under his hand, direct that such person
be detained for a period,
not exceeding six months,
59
order.
the
in
stated
This order may be extended from time to time. 60 The detainee has
the right to have his detention reviewed by a President of a District
Court within forty-eight hours, 6 1 and after that at least every three
62
months.
The procedure for review of the detainee's status enables the
state to refrain from full disclosure of the underlying evidence. According to section 6(c) of the law:
In proceedings under section 4 or 5, the President of
the District Court may accept evidence without the detainee or his representative being present and without
disclosing the evidence to them if, after studying the
evidence or hearing submissions, even in their absence, he is satisfied that disclosure of the evidence to
either of them may impair state security or public se63
curity.
Thus, the statutory standard of review in Israel is quite deferential to
the security interests of the state. The Israeli Detentions Law, by its
own language requires the judge to consider only whether the disclosure of evidence will impair state security, rather than balance the individual's interests with those of the state when making a determination of what evidence must be disclosed. As we will see, judges have
worked within this framework to develop means to provide further
protections to individuals.
In 2002, Israel enacted the Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 64 which applies to the detention of foreigners who reside
outside Israel and are apprehended for certain terrorist-related activities. 65 This law includes similar mechanisms of judicial review, with
59. Israel Detentions Law, § 2(a).
60.

Id. § 2(b).

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. § 4.
Id. § 5.
Id. § 6(c).
Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 (Isr.), available at

http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/7E86D098-0463-4F37-A38D-8AEBE77OBD

E6/0/lncarcerationLaweditedl40302.doc [hereinafter Israeli Unlawful Combatants Law].
65. The distinction between the two detention laws was analyzed in CrimA 6659/06 A
v. Israel [June 11, 2008], available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/06/590/066/n04/
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adjustments that take into consideration the different context-such
as allowing the first judicial review to take place within fourteen
days, 66 and then allowing that every additional review will take place
at least every six months. 67 This law also expressly provides for the
possibility of using secret evidence disclosed only to the court:
It shall be permissible to depart from the laws of evidence in proceedings under this Law, for reasons to be
recorded; the court may admit evidence, even in the
absence of the prisoner or his legal representative, or
not disclose such evidence to the aforesaid if, after
having reviewed the evidence or heard the submissions, even in the absence of the prisoner or his legal
representative, it is convinced that disclosure of the
is
evidence to the prisoner or his legal representative
68
likely to harm State security or public security.
Similar principles of judicial review coupled with authorized limits
conon disclosure of evidence to suspects also apply to detentions
69
ducted in the occupied territories based on military orders.
2.

A Judge-Made Mechanism

The fact that the review of detention decisions is conducted
without full disclosure of the evidence casts a shadow on the significance of judicial review in each of these detention contexts.
Against this background, the Israeli Supreme Court has developed an
activist approach in its review role of the non-disclosed evidence, 70 in
a way that starts to look like the practice of inquisitorial legal systems. This practice of the court has been described by Professor Itzhak Zamir, a scholar of Israeli public law and later a Justice on the
Israeli Supreme Court, in the following manner:

06066590.n04.pdf (not published).
66. Israeli Unlawful Combatants Law, § 5(a).
67. Id. § 5(c).
68. Id. § 5(e).
69. See, e.g., infra at II.B.2.
70. This activist judicial approach is not limited to detentions law. In general, the
judiciary has been at the fore of protections of individual rights in Israel. See Stephen
Goldstein, The Protection of Human Rights by Judges: The Israeli Experience, in JUDICIAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? 55 (M. Gibney & S. Frankowski eds.,

1999) ("Until quite recently, human rights in Israel have been protected almost exclusively
by judge-made law.").
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Due to the gravity of this situation, the Supreme Court
instituted a practice which has no basis in law. The
court dealing with the case suggests to the applicant
that the administrative authority, which keeps the evidence under a cloak of secrecy, present the evidence
only to the judges, behind closed doors, not in the
presence of the applicant. If the applicant agrees to
this proposal, the court will then examine the confi71
dential evidence.
More recently, Chief Justice Beinisch described this practice
in A v. State of Israel, a Supreme Court case that challenged the constitutionality of the provision allowing the non-disclosure of evidence
according to the new Unlawful Combatants Law (alongside several
72
other provisions of this law):
[I]n view of the of the problems inherent in relying
upon administrative evidence for the purpose of detention, the judicial system has over the years developed
a tool for control and scrutiny of intelligence material,
in so far as this is possible in a proceeding of the kind
that takes place in judicial review of administrative
detention. In these proceedings the judge is required
to question the validity and credibility of the administrative evidence that is brought before him and to as73
sess its weight.
The reviewing court plays a special role by performing the
aforesaid examination of evidence in a critical fashion, even viewing
it from the position of the detainee (were he able to access it). As
explained by Chief Justice Beinisch:
In view of the problems inherent in submitting privileged evidence ex parte, the court that carries out a
judicial review of an administrative detention is required to act with caution and great care when examining the material that is brought before it for its inspection alone. In such circumstances, the court has a
duty to act with great caution and to examine the pri71.

Itzhak Zamir, Human Rights and National Security, 23 ISR. L. REv. 375, 399

(1989).
72. CrimA 6659/06 A v. State of Israel [2008], available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/
files-eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf (not published).
73. Id. para. 43.
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vileged material brought before it from the viewpoint
of the detainee, who has
not seen the material and
74
it.
against
argue
cannot
In her judgment, Chief Justice Beinisch relied on an earlier
decision of the High Court of Justice in the matter of Barham v. Justice Colonel Shef.75 In Barham, the petitioner, detained according to
the legislation on administrative detentions in the occupied territories, 76 argued that the military judge, in his review of the undisclosed
materials serving as the basis for his detention, should question the
informants who provided the information. Justice Or, delivering the
court's decision, did not accept this argument but did emphasize the
importance of the judge's intensified scrutiny in an examination of
non-disclosed materials which constitute the basis for the detention
decision:
[T]he military judge may and should consider not only
the question whether prima facie the competent authority was entitled to decide what it decided on the
basis of the material that was before it, but the judge
should also consider the question of the credibility of
the material that was submitted as a part of its assessment of the weight of the material. Indeed, the fact
that certain "material" constitutes valid administrative
evidence, does not exempt the judge from examining
its degree of credibility against the background of the
other pieces of evidence, and the entirety of the case's
circumstances. As such, the "administrative evidence" label does not exempt the judge from the need
to demand and receive explanations from the bodies
that are able to provide them. To say otherwise,
would mean to greatly weaken the process of judicial
review and to allow for the elimination of liberty for
extended periods of time, on the basis of poor and in77
adequate material.
Thus, while a reviewing court need not call witnesses for questioning, it should attempt to test the quality and credibility of the government's evidence.

74. Id. (emphasis added).

75. HCJ 4400/98 Barham v. Justice Colonel Shefi [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 337.
76. Administrative Detentions Order (as amended), promulgated by the military
commander of the area.
77. [1998] IsrSC 52(5) at 346.
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Not only must the judge review the evidence for its reliability,
but she also should test the government's case generally. Justice
Procaccia's opinion in Khadri v. I.D.F Commander in Judea and
Samaria,78 further articulates the view of the court acting almost as
the detainee's advocate:
The administrative detention entails, more than once,
a deviation from the rules of evidence, among other
reasons, since the materials raised against the detainee
are not subjected to his review. This deviation imposes on the court a special duty to take extra care in the
reviewing of the confidential material, and to act as
to the
the detainee's "mouth" where he is not exposed
79
adverse materials, and cannot defend himself.
Justice Rubinstein expressed a similar view to that of Justice
Procaccia in Agbar v. I.D.F Commander in Judea and Samaria.80 In
the course of discussing the evidentiary problems arising from the
procedure of administrative detention, Justice Rubinstein opined that:
[I]n this situation the detainee does not enjoy a full
and adequate opportunity to defend himself against
the arguments raised against him-he is not exposed
to the majority of the evidences, he cannot review
them and he is unable to cross examine. This obliges
the court to employ extra care and strict examination
of the evidence brought before him. The court must
become "temporarydefense attorney. "81
The Israeli Supreme Court has expressed this view in many
other instances. 82 In sum, while the security services in Israel may be
78.

HCJ 11006/04 Khadri v. L.D.F Commander in Judea and Samaria [2004] (not

published).

79. Id. para. 6.
80.
81.
82.

HCJ 9441/07, para. 8 [2007] (not published).
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., HCJ 5555/05 Federman v. Commander of the Central Command [2005]

IsrSC 59(2) 865, 869 (according to Justice Rubinstein: "[The issue of undisclosed evidence]
imposes a special and enhanced duty on the adjudicating authorities in the military system,
and on this court ... to carefully examine what is brought before them, while acting also as a
mouth of sorts for whom the material was hidden from"); Administrative Detention App.
8788/03 Federman v. Minister of Defense [2003] IsrSC 58(1) 176, 187 (according to Justice
Grunis: "Due to the limited involvement of the detainee and his counsel in the procedure
undergoing before the Chief Justice of the district court, the Chief Justice must act as a
mouth to the detainee and examine the material brought before him in an intensive and
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granted more latitude in excluding the individual affected from the
relevant evidence against him, courts reviewing these decisions try to
compensate for this handicap through their heightened scrutiny of the
evidence.
It is important to add that the active role the Israeli Supreme
Court has taken upon itself is not supposed to replace the duty to disclose to the detained person the gist of the allegations against him. In
recent decisions, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the state
has to disclose the basic allegations to the detained, as an indepen83
dent duty, alongside the full disclosure of evidence to the court.
Still, there may be doubts whether disclosure of core allegations
alone gives enough basis for effective defense (e.g. if the detained
knows that he is suspected to be a member of a said terrorist organization, but does not know who were the people who attributed this
allegation to him).
C.

The Special Advocate Model

Another model used to bolster the gist requirement that balances secrecy and the ability to challenge evidence against a suspect
is based on the use of "special advocates," attorneys who, unlike the
suspect or his other legal representatives, are given access to secret
evidence and are charged with refuting the state's arguments and evidence-on behalf of the suspect or in some cases on behalf the
state-in a closed adversarial hearing. 84 The special advocate supplements the core by seeking disclosure of additional secret evidence
to the suspect as well as providing an additional level of evidentiary

thorough fashion"); Administrative Detention App. 6183/06 Gruner v. Minister of Defense
[2006] (not published) (according to Justice Cheshin, "during the discussion regarding the
approval of the [administrative] arrest warrant, the chief justice of the district court must
adopt an active course, that does not characterize the traditional role of the court in our
adversary system").
83. See HCJ 2595/09 Sofi v. State of Israel [2009] (not published). In this case, Justice
Rubinstein stressed that the limitation on disclosure should be "narrowed . . . to the
necessary minimum." Id. para. 21. See also HCJ 1510/09 Atamana v. State of Israel [2009]
(not published). In Atamana, Justice Hayut stressed that eventually all the relevant
allegations were revealed to the detainee. At the same time, it is clear from these two
decisions that the authorities did not tend to reveal the gist of the accusations to the detained,
and they did that eventually only under the pressure of the court.
84. See generally John Ip, The Rise and Spread of the Special Advocate, PUB. L. 71741 (2008) (detailing the historical development of special advocates as a way to balance
secrecy and fairness).
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scrutiny and legal challenge to evidence that remains undisclosed to
the suspect.
1.

Modem Origins

Canada and the United Kingdom 85 currently utilize special
advocates to offer a measure of procedural fairness to those facing
deprivation of their liberty due to alleged terrorist connections, and
for whom classified or closed materials are the source of the allegations against them. 86 Judicial decisions from both national and supranational courts have influenced this model and provided an impetus for further procedural protection. 87
The European Court of Human Rights played a significant
role in shaping the special advocate system in both the United Kingdom and Canada. In 1996, the Court, in Chahal v. United Kingdom,
heard the case of a detained immigrant who challenged the procedures of his deportation appeal, namely that the appeals court did not
have access to closed information relating to his threat to national security and was thus ill-equipped to review the decision of the Home
Secretary to deport him. 88 The Court ruled unanimously that the
United Kingdom was in violation of Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides for an "effective remedy
before a national authority" where rights of the Convention are vi-

85. New Zealand has also taken steps to implement the use of special advocates.
Indeed, special advocates were appointed on an ad hoc basis in the case of Zaoui v. Attorney
General, [2004] 2 N.Z.L.R. 339 (H.C.), where the Attorney General of New Zealand issued a
security risk certificate against Zaoui under the Immigration Act. Following this hearing,
New Zealand's parliament has worked to amend its immigration legislation to provide for
the statutory use of special advocates in immigration proceedings where closed materials are
relied upon by the government. New Zealand's model is largely influenced by the existing
methods used in Canada and the U.K. See generally John Ip, The Adoption of the Special
Advocate Under New Zealand's Immigration Bill (Nov. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law).
86. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27 (Can.) §§ 83(1.2), 85
[hereinafter IRPA]; Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997, c. 68 (Eng.)
[hereinafter SIAC]; Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003, S.I.
2003/1034, arts. 35, 37 (U.K.) [hereinafter SIAC Rules]; Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005,
c. 2, § 1 (U.K.) [hereinafter PTA].
87. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831; Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't v. MB [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 A.C. 440; A v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68; Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (Can.).
88. 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1844-46.
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olated. 89 The Court found the protections afforded to Chahal were
deficient where he was unable to challenge his detention in court because materials that were relied upon by the government were disclosed neither to him nor the court. 90
In its opinion, the Court referenced Canada's Immigration
Act of 1976 as a means by which to strengthen judicial review in
proceedings where classified materials are involved, through the use
of special security-cleared counsel to examine witnesses and "test the
strength of the State's case." 91 The Court opined that the use of special advocates "accommodate[s] legitimate security concerns about
the nature and sources of intelligence information and yet accord[s]
the individual a substantial measure of procedural justice. ' 92 The
Court's advice did not fall on deaf ears and following the Chahal
opinion, the U.K. Parliament enacted the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act of 1997, which provided, in part, for the use
of a special advocate in immigration proceedings to represent the interests of a complainant on appeal where classified materials were relied upon by the State. 93 Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Parliament incorporated the use of special
advocates in hearings for suspected terrorists, first in the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act of 200194 and later in the Preven95
tion of Terrorism Act of 2005.

The House of Lords in M.B. v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department96 solidified the legitimacy of special advocates in
light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It
accepted that the use of special advocates will often result in a fair
hearing, and thus refused to issue a declaration of incompatibility between challenged domestic law and the ECHR, 97 though some mem89.
90.

ECHR, supra note 17, Art. 13; 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1871.
1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1870-71.

91.

Id. at 1869.

92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1866-67.
SIAC, supra note 86, § 6.
Under section 21 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 1,

the Secretary of State was given broad powers to indefinitely detain non-citizens that he or
she reasonably believed to be a threat to national security and suspected to be a terrorist. In
order to detain these individuals, the United Kingdom in section 30 of the 2001 Act asserted

a derogation from the Convention by declaring a state of national emergency, the legitimacy
of which was challenged successfully in A v. Secretary of State.
95. The PTA repealed the detention provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act and instead provides for control orders that impose restrictions of movement
and association. See PTA, supra note 86, § 1(4).
96. [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 A.C. 440.
97. Id. para. 70, at 490 (Baroness Hale).
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bers warned that special advocates could not replace the requirement
to provide an individual with a gist of the materials against him. 98
Canada implemented the use of special advocates in national
security contexts in 2007, borrowing from the United Kingdom. 99
The impetus was Charkaoui v. Canada (Immigration and Citizenship) where the Supreme Court found that section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms' 00 requires at minimum that "a substantial substitute for that information must be found" and that no
substitute was afforded under the Immigrant and Refugee Protection
Act (IRPA). ° ' The Supreme Court also concluded that the violation
of section 7 could not be justified by the prior doctrinal test that "requires a pressing and substantial objective and proportional
means" 02 because less intrusive alternatives-namely the use of special advocates-could be employed to ensure the same result.' 03 The
Canadian Parliament amended the IRPA with provisions calling for
the use of special advocates to act in the interests of affected individuals.

2.

04

Basic Features

The basis of the Special Advocate Model is the use of special
counsel to represent the interests of an individual who faces the loss
of liberty in contexts where the government seeks to rely on closed
materials. 105 However, both the United Kingdom and Canada provide that the relationship between the individual and the special ad-

98. Id. para. 84, at 495 (Lord Carswell) (noting "a qualification that the powers
conferred do not extend to withholding particulars of reasons or evidence where to do so
would deprive the controlee of a fair trial"); id. para. 35, at 480 (Lord Cornhill) (suggesting
that even with a special advocate "the task of the court in any given case is to decide,
looking at the process as a whole, whether a procedure has been used which involved
significant injustice to the controlled person").
99. See SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT, FUNDAMENTAL
JUSTICE IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: MAIN REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SENATE COMMITrEE ON
THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT, at 30-42 (Feb. 2007) (Can.).
100. Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.)
101. [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 388 (Can.).
102. Id. at 391.
103. Id. at 392.
104. IRPA, supra note 86, § 85.
105. PTA, supra note 86, §§ 4(3)(b), 7; IRPA, supra note 86, § 83(b).
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vocate is not "that of solicitor and client"' 106 and that the special advocate is not responsible to the individual. 07 As such, the special
advocate's ethical responsibilities are not clearly delineated. 08 In the
British and Canadian cases, the appointment of a special advocate
occurs in proceedings to determine whether the individual is himself
a threat to national security, and must be detained or subject to control orders limiting him to house arrest. 109 The closed materials can
make up a substantial portion of the government's case against an individual." 0 Further, as the individual is not subject to criminal proceedings, the standard of proof on the government is usually not as
demanding as that for criminal conviction, instead requiring the reasonableness of the government's judgment."'I
The special advocate provides a procedural check against the
power of the government in these proceedings, fulfilling two impor12
tant functions: testing the validity of the closed materials relied on'
and pushing for more extensive disclosure of information by challenging the nature of the public interest at stake." 3 In performing
these duties the special advocate can make oral or written submissions to the court and cross-examine witnesses. 1 4 However, he is
limited by restrictions on communication with the affected person after the secret evidence has been disclosed. 115 In the statutory regimes
of Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, special advocates
are unable to communicate with the affected person after having received the closed materials unless they gain special permission of the
court.' 16 In practice, after gaining access to closed materials, special
106.

IRPA, supra note 86, § 85.1(3).

107. PTA, supra note 86, para. 7(5) ("A person appointed under this paragraph is not to
be responsible to the person whose interests he is appointed to represent.").
108. See Andrew Boon & Susan Nash, Special Advocacy: Political Expediency and
Legal Roles in Modern Judicial Systems, 9 LEGAL ETHICS 101 (2006).
109. IRPA, supra note 86, §§ 78, 81-82; PTA, supra note 86, § 1(4).
110. See Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (Can.); MB v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't [2007] UKHL 46, para. 3, [2008] 1 A.C. 440, 467-68.

111.

IRPA, supra note 86, § 81 ("reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a

danger to national security"); PTA, supra note 86, § 2(1) (reasonable grounds to suspect).
112. IRPA, supra note 86, § 85.1(2)(b); Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, pt.
76.24 (U.K.) [hereinafter CPR].
113. IRPA, supra note 86, § 85.1(2)(a); CPR, supra note 112, pt. 76.24; HOUSE OF
LORDS, HOUSE OF COMMONS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTERTERRORISM
POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 28 DAYS, INTERCEPT AND POST-CHARGE QUESTIONING,

2006-7,

H.L. 157, H.C. 394, at 51 (U.K.) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE, 28 DAYS].
114. IRPA, supra note 86, § 85.2; CPR, supra note 112, pt. 76.24.

115. IRPA, supra note 86, § 85.4(2); CPR, supra note 112, pt. 76.25.
116. IRPA, supra note 86, § 85.4(2); CPR, supra note 112, pt. 76.25; Immigration Bill
132-2, cl.
238 (2007) (N.Z.).
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advocates often work to find "open sources" of the materials
that can
1 7
be accessed by the person affected and their legal counsel.'
Special advocates strive to gain an acceptable open summary
of the closed materials." 8 In practice, once the closed materials have
been revealed to them, special advocates dedicate a great amount of
time in fighting for disclosure to the suspect. 119 Pushing for more
disclosure can involve both working with the government to formulate an acceptable version of the evidence to be disclosed or finding
substitutes for the materials. As one special advocate explained:
Part of our role in trying to secure as much disclosure
as possible for the appellant involves trying to suggest
to the Secretary of State's side, to the Security Service, gists that might be acceptable. We are constantly trying to formulate gists of closed material which
we think might enable the Secretary of State to make
something open, perhaps in a slightly different form,
concealing the 12source
but at least making the thrust of
0
the point open.

By working for further disclosure, the special advocate challenges the
assumptions of the government and the court regarding what must be
kept secret. Although in practice the special advocates are not always able to gain further disclosure, 121 they serve as a procedural
check on unquestioned governmental authority to determine what can
be disclosed.
While the special advocate model can improve the protection
afforded to individuals concerned, the inability to communicate with
the person affected or his regular counsel following disclosure of the
closed evidence limits his effectiveness. In a case where significant
portions of the government's case are closed, there may be little that
a special advocate can do to prepare to seriously test the evidence.
According to one special advocate:
117.

See JorNr COMMITrEE, 28 DAYS, supra note 113, at Ev. 13 (testimony of Mr. Blake)

("Much of our work on disclosure is seeing whether there is an open source for materials.").
118. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. MB [2007] UKHL 46, paras. 64-65,
[2008] 1 A.C. 440, 488 (Baroness Hale noted that "it is necessary to go further than
[appointing a special advocate] and ask whether the use of a special advocate can solve the
problem where the Secretary of State wishes to withhold from the controlled person material
upon which she wishes to rely in order to establish her case").
119. See JOfNT COMMITTEE, 28 DAYS, supra note 113, at Ev. 10 (Mr. Blake stating, "I
suspect that many of us would feel at the moment that our most important function is on the
disclosure front of what, if anything, can go from closed to open").
120. Id. at Ev. 15 (testimony of Mr. Chamberlain).
121.

Id. at 51, para. 195.
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The preclusion of communication frequently limits the
essence of the function, because you may have no idea
what the real case is until you have gone closed, and
therefore there has been nothing provided to you by
way of either prior statement, or prior meeting or con22
ference with the person concerned.
While this restriction is maintained as a means to ensure that the
closed information remains confidential, there have been suggestions
in Canada and the United Kingdom that this risk can be overcome by
additional protections, for example by requiring that the special advocate gain permission from the court to speak with the individual af123
fected after the disclosure of secret evidence.
A further limitation faced by the special advocate, and which
the special advocate is in part meant to remedy, is often the lack of
any useful open summary of the government's case. 124 As noted, the
special advocate in practice devotes significant time to making an
open core of the case available to the person affected, but where this
is not successful and where the special advocate cannot communicate
with the person affected after disclosure, the special advocate's function is stunted. Indeed, this was the concern of the House of Lords in
Secretary of State of the Home Department v. MB, which concluded
that in some cases, even with the appointment of a special advocate, a
judge may be required to rule that a trial has been unfair. 125 In reaction, the Joint Committee on Human Rights in the United Kingdom
has proposed amending the procedures to require, like the Canadian
statute requires, 126 that the government proffer a summary of the

122.

Id. at Ev. 14 (testimony of Mr. Blake).

123. See HOUSE OF LORDS, HOUSE OF COMMONS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (TENTH REPORT): COUNTER-TERRORISM

BILL, 2007-8, H.L.

108, H.C. 554, at 36 (U.K.)

[hereinafter JOINT COMMITrEE,

CONTERTERRORISM]; accord SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT,

FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES 35 (Feb. 2007) (Can.) (stating "if the
special advocate is able to communicate with the party affected by the proceedings only
before receiving the confidential information, his or her role is rendered much less effective,
as he or she is unable to meaningfully test the reliability of a specific piece of classified or
sensitive information, or the validity of keeping it confidential").
124. The Canadian statute, unlike the U.K. statute, requires that at minimum the
individual "is provided with a summary of information and other evidence that enables them
to be reasonably informed of the [government's] case." IRPA, supra note 86, § 83(1)(e).
125. Home Sec'y v. MB [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 A.C. 440, para. 70 (opinion of
Baroness Hale).
126. See infra notes 134, 139 and accompanying text.
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closed evidence on which it relies and "on which fairness requires the
controlled person have an opportunity to comment." 127
III.

THE INNER RELATIONSHIP AND RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF
THE MODELS

Having described the common baseline approach (the gist requirement) and two models for supplementing it (the judicial management and special advocate mechanisms), how should one compare them or choose among them as elements of possible reform?
This Part offers a framework for analysis, considering two sets of
questions.
First, the judicial management and special advocate models
operate atop the baseline gist requirement-they are intended to supplement it. In practice, do they improve the functioning of the gist
requirement, or do they degrade its effectiveness?
Second, these models are instruments of due process and procedural fairness. Which specific aspects of due process do they
serve? One goal of procedural due process is individual participation
in a manner that demonstrates respect for individual dignity. A
second goal is decision-making accuracy. A third goal is systemic
regulation of coercive state powers. This Part considers each in turn.
It demonstrates that the different regimes applied are inspired by varying emphases on these three goals, and considers how effectively
they advance them and some of the trade-offs among them.
A.

Increasingthe Gist or Suppressing It?

As explained above, the two models examined-the judicialgovernance model and the special advocate model-were both developed to deal with shortcomings of the partial disclosure of secret
evidence to persons who face potential deprivations of liberty. They
are intended to serve as solutions to the infringement flowing from
this limited disclosure.
Despite this starting point, experience and commentary
among actors within these systems suggests that the models may not
only compensate for lack of disclosure, as intended, but sometimes
may serve to justify more limited disclosure in such proceedings.
Rather than supplement the disclosure of the gist, there is a danger
127.

JOINT COMMITTEE, COUNTERTERRORISM,

supra note 123, at 36.
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that these additional protections may be used in ways that undermine
the gist protection. In this sense, their use may not always be a blessing from a fairness perspective.
The British experience illustrates the possibility that the employment of special advocates may in some cases suppress liberal
gist disclosure. Because the statutory framework in the United Kingdom, unlike its counterpart in Canada, does not explicitly provide for
a requirement that a summary of the evidence be provided to the individual, 128 the government did not always provide it. In some instances, for example, when the government was unable or unwilling
to provide an open gist to an individual faced with a deprivation of
liberty, the government argued that the baseline protections of the
European Convention on Human Rights were satisfied without requiring a gist at all where special advocates are utilized to compen9
sate. 12
The use of special advocates may also undermine gist protections by encouraging over-classification of evidence. Special advocates have noted that in practice the government is often overly cautious, sometimes even asserting evidence as classified that is widely
available. 130 Moreover, knowing that special advocates are there to
help protect against government miscarriages of justice, the government may be even less forthcoming in declassifying information.
The British Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights in its
January 2008 report, reacting to this possible tendency toward diluting core disclosure requirements, suggested that the statutory frame-

128. Rule of Civil Procedure 76.28 § 2(c) provides that the Secretary of State must "if
he considers it possible to summarise that material without disclosing information contrary
to the public interest, [serve on the special advocate] a summary of that material." CPR,
supra note 112. The Canadian statute, however, requires that the judge "shall ensure that the
permanent resident or foreign national is provided with a summary of information and other
evidence that enables them to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister in
the proceeding but that does not include anything that, in the judge's opinion, would be
injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person if disclosed." IRPA,
supra note 86, § 83(l)(e).
129. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. AF (No. 3) [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1148, [2009]
2 W.L.R. 423 (U.K.).
130. One special advocate noted that the U.K. government was "attempting to keep in
closed the particular assertion we wanted in open, and we were able to point to the fact that
it had been in the Buckingham Palace section of The Times not very long ago! ... So they
do tend, I think, to be very cautious."

HOUSE OF LORDS, HOUSE OF COMMONS, JOINT

COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (EIGHTH
REPORT): COUNTER-TERRORISM BILL,

of Mr. Gamham).

2007-8, H.L. 50, H.C. 199, at Ev. 7 (U.K.) (testimony
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work be amended to require expressly that the government provide
an individual with a gist of the closed materials.'31
Courts have also been mindful of the potential downward
pressure on disclosure that may come inadvertently from additional
procedural protections. In MB, the House of Lords held that the trial
court must ensure that the trial has been fair, and members of the
House of Lords noted that the use of special advocates might not always be able to remedy the lack of the gist. 132 The recent decision of
the European Court of Human Rights took this notion a step further,
insisting that the gist requirement could not be replaced by the use of
special advocates:
The Court further considers that the special advocate
could perform an important role in counterbalancing
the lack of full disclosure and the lack of a full, open,
adversarial hearing by testing the evidence and putting
arguments on behalf of the detainee during the closed
hearings. However, the special advocate could not
perform this function in any useful way unless the detainee was provided with sufficient information about
the allegations against him to enable him to give ef133
fective instructionsto the special advocate.
As this indicates, while the existence of special advocates may tempt
the government to cut back on other fairness protections, courts are
equipped to ensure that the gist is supplanted-and not replaced-by
the use of special advocates, especially if courts view them as operating in tandem rather than as possible substitutes. Further, while the
employment of special advocates may prompt the government to
over-classify, the ability of the special advocate to challenge classification of evidence operates as a counter-weight. In the Canadian
context, after the statutory introduction of special advocates was established, the government declassified evidence it previously main-

131. Id. at 19, para. 48.
132. Home Sec'y v. MB [2007] UKHL 46, paras. 66-68, [2008] 1 A.C. 440, 489-90
(Baroness Hale noted, "I do not think that we can be confident that Strasbourg would hold
that every control order hearing in which the special advocate procedure had been used, as
contemplated by the 2005 Act and CPR Pt 76, would be sufficient to comply with article 6
[of the European Convention]"); see also id. para. 43, at 482 (Lord Bingham).
133. A. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 220 (2009), available at http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/view.asp?action=html&documentld=847470&portal=hbkm&sou
rce=extemalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01CI 66DEA398649 (emphasis
added); see also AF v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 2001
(Q.B.) (U.K.) (applying the European Court of Human Right's decision).
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tained as classified, perhaps in anticipation that the special advocate
would bring these materials into the open anyway. 134
In a similar manner, the development of the judicial management model may be invoked to justify a very limited disclosure of information to the detainee, based on the rationale that any lack of disclosure can be remedied when a neutral court eventually scrutinizes
secret evidence. In this spirit, the Israeli Supreme Court dismissed a
broad challenge to the non-disclosure of evidence to detained combatants. Chief Justice Beinisch reasoned:
In view of the fact that there is a judicial review of the
detention, and in view of the care with which the court
is required to examine the privileged material brought
before it ex parte, it cannot be said that the arrangement provided in section 5(e) of the law in itself vi35
olates the rights of detainees disproportionately. 1
In other words, the court found that judicial management is an adequate substitute for basic disclosures.
The special advocate model, bolstered by judicial or statutory
rules requiring some irreducible minimum disclosures, may be better
suited to protect the gist than the judicial management model because
the special advocate is charged with the specific adversarial role of
promoting declassification. Yet, on the basis of the basic features of
the models alone, it is not clear that either has a clear advantage in
terms of securing the floor of core disclosure. Both were developed
in order to add to the core requirement of disclosure, but in practice
they may not always function so. It is only when put into operation
in a particular jurisdiction that the potential for abuse can be fully examined. One way to help backstop the procedural regime against this
contingency is for the legislature to expressly require that the gist be
disclosed in all cases. 13 6

134. For a further discussion of this phenomenon, see Kent Roach, Charkaoui and Bill
C-3, (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 281, 337 (Can.).
135. CrimA 6659/06 A v. Israel [2008], para. 43 (not published).

136. The U.K. Joint Committee has made such a suggestion, "[t]o give full effect to the
judgment in MB, we recommend that the statutory framework be amended to provide that
rules of court for control order proceedings 'must require the Secretary of State to provide a
summary of any material which fairness requires the controlled person have an opportunity
to comment on."' JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (EIGHTH REPORT): COUNTER TERRORISM-BILL, 2007-8, H.L. 50, H.C. 199,
para. 66.
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JudicialManagement Versus Special Advocates

In theory, judicial management and special advocates need
not be mutually exclusive models. Their simultaneous use is unlike-

ly, however, and for several reasons there has been very little consideration of how they could be combined. First, their common purpose

means that the use of one would make the other seem redundant.
Second, a choice between them generally reflects a fundamental preference for either an active or a passive role for judges in directly
scrutinizing evidence.
In framing a comparison of their relative merits, this Part examines the competing models against three core values or functions

of due process: participation, accuracy and checking coercive state
powers. 137 The first two pertain to individual case adjudication: how
effectively does an approach assure that an individual has an adequate opportunity to defend himself or how effectively does it gener-

ate factual truth? The third pertains to systemic concerns: across
cases and over time, how effectively does an approach help regulate
government powers?
1.

Fairness and Individual Dignity

One fundamental aspect of procedural fairness is the partici-

pation of the accused in the outcome of adjudication.1 38 As the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted, there are "two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decision-making process."139 Although individual

137. Procedural fairness "may improve the quality of the decision, serve the purpose of
promoting human dignity and assist in achieving a sense that justice has both been done and
seen to be done; it may promote objectivity and impartiality, or, as just noted, increase the
likelihood of an accurate substantive outcome." LORD WOOLF ET AL., DE SMITH'S JUDICIAL

REVIEW 318-19 (6th ed. 2007); see also Gus Van Harten, Charkaoui and Secret Evidence,
42 SuP. CT. L. REV.2d 251, 252 (2008) (Can.) (arguing that "use of evidence threatens to
erode the integrity of adjudicative decision-making" in three ways: increasing risk of error;
undermining confidence in administration of justice; and diluting effectiveness of checks
against abuses of state power). This is not to deny that due process or fairness may serve
other values, including public communication of principles and justice.
138. For an overview of the various models and interpretations of the values underlying
due process, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B. U. L. REV. 885 (1981); Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S.CAL. L.
REV. 181,237-305 (2004).
139. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
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participation helps to minimize error, it is also an end in itself, promoting individual dignity by allowing those affected the opportunity
to explain themselves.140 Individual participation also promotes legi41
timacy, validating the exercise of state power.'
In light of these values underlying procedural fairness, as well
as the notion that "a party is not to suffer in person or in purse without an opportunity of being heard" is among the oldest established
principles in English administrative law, 142 how effectively does each
model presented promote participation and enhance an individual's
opportunity to be heard?
It could be argued that the special advocate model has some
relative advantages over the judicial management model in effectuating a sense of participation. This model not only creates another procedural check on the process of detention, independent of the decision-maker, but it also introduces an adversarial element whenever
closed evidence is implicated, thereby adding to the sense than an individual has had his day in court. 143 An individual's special advocate
is able to effect the individual's participation as his proxy by offering
counter arguments, cross-examining witnesses and challenging the
credibility of the evidence. Through the special advocate's mouth,
the individual is afforded an opportunity to be heard. 144
Providing a suspect with a means to participate in his hearing--even if indirectly, by proxy-has proven to be a prime motivator in the development of the special advocate model. In Charkaoui,
the Canadian case that prompted the Canadian Parliament to devise
and implement procedures using special advocates, the Canadian Supreme Court's analysis focused on "whether the process is fundamentally unfair to the affected person" rather than whether the outcome of the procedure was accurate. 45 At the same time as
Charkaoui was being heard, a special committee of the Canadian
Parliament noted that in such cases the lack of participation affected
140. For a discussion of instrumental and non-instrumental justifications for due
process, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 85,
109-19 (1982).
141. For a discussion of participation and legitimacy, see Solum, supra note 138, at
273-305.
142. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 224 (3d ed. 1991) (citing Painter v.
Liverpool Gas Co., (1836) 11 Eng. Rep. 478, 484 (K.B.)).
143. This is not to imply that the inquisitorial system used in civil law jurisdiction is
inferior, only that as all the countries examined follow the adversarial system it may be that
courts and parties to this litigation will benefit from a familiar system.
144. The value of special advocates on participation is minimal where the individuals
concerned refuse to take part in proceedings at all.
145. Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 372 (Can.).
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the perceived legitimacy of the adjudicatory process and recommended that in immigration proceedings using closed information,
"procedural disadvantages should be reduced through the appoint1 46
ment of a special advocate who would test the government's case."'
Underlying this strong concern for individual advocacy in the
development of the special advocate model may be the adversarial
tradition, "anchored by a profound loyalty and desire to protect individual rights guaranteed by our constitution coupled with an explicit
rejection of inquisitorial tactics. ' 147 Indeed, notions of party autonomy underlie the adversarial system used in the United States, as well
as Canada and the United Kingdom. 148 This emphasis on dignity
values inherent in a suspect's participation-as a driver of special
advocate policies-is especially clear in Lord Hoffman's opinion in
the recent British control orders case:
Ordinarily it is true that fairness requires that an accused person should be informed of all the allegations
against him and the material tendered to the tribunal in
support. The purpose of the rule is not merely to improve the chances of the tribunal reaching the right
decision... but to avoid the subjective sense of injustice which an accused may feel if he knows that the
tribunal relied upon material of which he was not
told. 149
There are, of course, severe limits to the special advocate
model's ability to effectuate participation values. Because special
advocates cannot communicate with their clients on some matters,
they do not stand in their clients' shoes in the same way lawyers do
in other common law adversarial proceedings. They are not allowed
to discuss the evidence with the detained individual after they have
been exposed to it. The suspect may not even know what arguments
are being pursued on his behalf. To the extent that fairness is about
146.

SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT, FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE IN

EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: MAIN REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ANTI-

TERRORiSMACT, at 30 (Feb. 2007) (Can.).
147. Raneta Lawson Mack, It's Broke So Let's Fix It:

Using a Quasi-Inquisitorial

Approach to Limit the Impact of Bias in the American CriminalJustice System, 7 IND. INT'L

& COMP. L. REv. 63,63 (1998).
148. See Air Canada v. Sec'y of State for Trade (No. 2), [1983] 2. A.C. 394, 411 (H.L.)
(Lord Denning) ("[W]hen we speak of the due administration of justice this does not always
mean ascertaining the truth of what happened.").
149. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. AF, [2009] UKHL 28, para. 72 (Lord
Hoffman).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[48:3

participatory or dignity values, the notion of relying on special advocates outside the suspect's presence or full awareness is a poor substitute for direct suspect involvement in that portion of his own defense. Nevertheless, special advocates offer some adversarial
contestation on behalf of the suspect and are ethically independent of
government institutions interested in depriving him of liberty or
charged with deciding his fate.
Considering all the above, it is very hard to say whether on
balance the special advocate model indeed promotes participation
values. Formally speaking, it does so, but the acceptance of this argument is based on a very shallow understanding of the meaning of
participation, and similar arguments could be made about judicial
management. There is some prospect that special advocates may
seem to be less connected to the state and its apparatus-in comparison to a managerial court-especially if they are not full-time public
employees. But even this statement should be viewed skepticallysince special advocate candidates will have to pass a rigorous clearance processes by the security services.
2.

Fairness and Accuracy

Another value that underlies procedural fairness and due
process is accuracy, or the ability of procedures to protect against error.1 50 To what extent do these competing models help generate factual truth?
This is the utilitarian aspect of due process, which focuses on
the costs of decision-making and mistakes. The addition of another
advocate who challenges the validity of closed evidence arguably increases the accuracy of fact-finding, but a similar argument can be
posed with regard a very robust approach by the court. Ultimately
this debate tends to be resolved in any given legal system less by empirical study than by its customary faith in inquisitorial versus adversarial examination of disputed facts. That said, one detects a greater
priority on accuracy in the jurisprudence of judicial management than
in that of special advocate systems, probably flowing from the correspondingly greater priority on dignity or participation values in the
latter.
As noted earlier, the judicial management model reflects a
more inquisitorial method of decision-making-whereby the judge

150. For an overview of accuracy in procedural theory, see Solum, supra note 138, at
244-52.
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has a greater responsibility for fact-gathering. 151 And in the judicial
management model, similar to some inquisitorial systems, this reflects a priority on accuracy. Recall from above Chief Justice Beinisch's concern with "the problems inherent in relying upon administrative evidence," necessitating judicial tools for ensuring "validity
and credibility of the administrative evidence."' 152 Justice Or, too,
highlights reliability of evidence in discussing judicial management.1 53 Without emphasizing the inherent virtue of a suspect's participation in his own defense, Or cautions against "elimination of liberty for extended periods of time, on the basis of poor and
inadequate material."' 154 To solve this problem, "[t]he decisionmaker
is active; he uses the informational sources himself. Information does
not reach him in the form of two one-sided accounts; he strives to reconstruct the 'whole story' directly."' 55 Underlying this model is the
inquisitorial notion that a judge must ensure that all relevant facts
come to light. In a traditional adversarial system, by contrast, the
judge must rule based on the facts presented by the parties, even if
they are not the full factual picture. 156
These procedural differences, some have argued, 157 reflect
differing notions of truth. The adversarial system's focus on individual rights results in a compromised version of truth, a "pragmatic
truth" or relative truth 58 that is a function of the extent to which individual rights were protected. 159 On the other hand, the argument
goes, the inquisitorial model aims at discovering the actual truth-by

151. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 824 (1985).
152. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
154. HCJ 4400/98 Barham v. Justice Colonel Shefi [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 337, 346
(emphasis added).
155. Mirian Damaska, Presentationof Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1975). But see Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA.

L.REv 1267, 1283 (1975) (questioning Wigmore's suggestion that the adversarial system "is
beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
156. See Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form and Function: The Search for Truth
and the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and InquisitorialJustice Systems, 12 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. 185, 188-89 (2002).
157. See, e.g., Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargainingand the Americanization Thesis in CriminalProcedure,45

HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 10-11 (2004); King, supra note 156.
158. Langer, supra note 157, at 10.
159. King, supra note 156, at 189.
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permitting the judge to gain a complete factual accounting
of the
60
events in question, even at the expense of individual rights.1
This is not to suggest that accuracy interests are absent from a
special advocate model. 16' Rather, it is to illustrate a different emphasis on how to weigh accuracy and participation, and how the two
reinforce each other. Implied in the decisions and commentary discussing fairness in Canada and the United Kingdom, for example, is
a legislative and judicial understanding that the special advocate procedures will help bring about more accurate judgments, driven by a
belief that truth is mostly likely to emerge through adversarial competition. 162 As noted, the Canadian Parliament considered that one
function of the special advocate was to test the government's
case 163-thereby mitigating the risk of false positives.164

160. Id. at 188.
161. Supporters of special advocates would defend their accuracy-enhancing function
by referring to faith in adversarial challenge as the best way to reach truth. See also Keith A.
Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science and the Search for
Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV 893, 900 (2008) ("To some commentators, the inquisitorial
system is the superior system for finding the truth, because the inquisitorial system places
truth as its highest value, while the adversary system, by placing control of the facts and the
litigation in the hands of opposing parties ... primarily values dispute resolution."). See
also Sir Anthony Mason, The Future of Adversarial Justice (paper presented at the 17th
AIJA Annual Conference, Adelaide, Aug. 7, 1999), at 4, availableat http://www.aija.org.au/
online/mason.rtf:
It is a mistake to regard the two systems as static . . . . To-day [sic] the
The
European system ... places more emphasis on procedural fairness ....

adversarial system, by moving to case management, begins to resemble the
European system in expecting the judge to exercise more control over the
litigation. Nevertheless, the defining criterion that distinguishes the two
systems is the greater emphasis on procedural fairness which is characteristic
of the adversarial system.
162. See Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, para. 63 (Can.) ("If the judge
cannot provide the named person with a summary of the information that is sufficient to
enable the person to know the case to meet, then the judge cannot be satisfied that the
information before him or her is sufficient or reliable."); see also Roach, supra note 134, at
291-92.
163. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
164. See also the discussion of accuracy and the relative risks of false positives and
negatives in Lord Hoffman's opinion in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF,
[2009] UKHL 28, para. 74:
There are practical limits to the extent to which one can devise a procedure
which carries no risk of a wrong decision. .

.

. A system of justice which

allowed a thousand guilty men to go free for fear of convicting one innocent
man might not adequately protect the public. Likewise, the fact that in theory
there is always some chance that the applicant might have been able to
contradict closed evidence is not in my opinion a sufficient reason for saying,
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In countries like the United States, where adversarial tradition
runs very deep and judges are not accustomed to performing investigatory roles, transitioning to judicial management to scrutinize secret
evidence is difficult. The Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui
noted that:
[Canadian judges] have worked assiduously to overcome the difficulties inherent in the role the IRPA has
assigned to them. To their credit, they have adopted a
pseudo-inquisitorial role and sought to seriously test
the protected documentation and information. But the
role remains pseudo-inquisitorial. The judge is not afforded the power to independently investigate all relevant facts that true inquisitorial judges enjoy. At the
same time, since the named person is not given a full
picture of the case to meet, the judge cannot rely on
the parties to present missing evidence. The result is
that, at the end of the day, one cannot be sure that the
65
judge has been exposed to the whole factual picture)
In other words, the judicial management approach and its accuracyenhancing function cannot easily be transplanted to other common
law systems without endowing courts with additional powers and, as
the following section explores, building judicial expertise.
3.

Fairness and Systemic Regulation

Another purpose of procedural fairness, in addition to participation and accuracy in individual cases, is to help regulate the detention system across many cases. That is, procedural safeguards can
help check the expansion or abuse of coercive state powers generally,
before or after any particular case reaches a courtroom. For example,
mechanisms for testing evidence can uncover and deter improper interrogation or surveillance practices or overbroad application of intrusive or extraordinary authorities. 66 This is an especially important
in effect, that control orders can never be made against dangerous people if the
case against them is based "to a decisive degree" upon material which cannot
in the public interest be disclosed. This, however, is what we are now obliged
to declare to be the law.
165. [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, para. 51 (emphasis added).
166. An example is Guantanamo habeas cases. See, e.g., Carol Rosenberg, Judge: Free
Kuwaiti Engineer at Guantanamo, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 17, 2009, available at http://

www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/guantanamo/story/1239065.html (discussing case of
litigation exposing abusive interrogation); Del Quentin & Julie Tate, Detainee'sLawyers to
Get InterrogationTapes, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2009, at A04 (same).
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function of procedural fairness in the national security context, because secrecy helps insulate government policies and practices from
67
other forms of political scrutiny and accountability.
We hypothesize that judges who conduct a close review of
detention decisions on a regular basis can contribute not only to the
results of the individual process at hand, but also to effective review
of the system over time in ways that the special advocate model may
be less equipped to do. This could be the most significant advantage,
or relative contribution, of the judicial management model, though
we explain below some subtle counter-advantages that special advo68
cates may bring and some ways the models might be combined.
The ability of the judicial management model to function as
an effective form of systemic control is likely dependent on some additional features of the system. Among the most important is that
judges conducting the review should be repeat players who gain experience dealing with national security intelligence. This requires
that judges participate in the review of many cases over time and acquire perspective, experience and confidence with regard to the practice of the security services in general. 169 The less expertise judges
have in intelligence matters, the more dependent they are on government agents appealing to them for secrecy, and the less fervently they
are likely to challenge government assertions; greater experience and
expertise that comes from repeat play may help steel judges against
these propensities. 170 The justices of the Israeli Supreme Court often
mention their accumulated experience and refer to it as a basis for

167.

See Gus Van Harten, Charkaoui and Secret Evidence, 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 251, 261

(2008) (Can.) ("Without independent review of specific cases of possible misrepresentation
by the executive, it is difficult for those on the outside, including the courts, to know how
widespread and how serious the misuse of secrecy powers may be."); Yaroshefsky, supra
note 55, at 1071 (arguing that reliance on secret evidence undermines checks on coercive
state powers).
168.

See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.

169. This has been suggested in other contexts in which classified materials play a role,
namely immigration review. See Matthew R. Hall, ProceduralDue Process Meets National
Security: The Problem of Classified Evidence in Immigration Proceedings, 35 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 515 (2002).
170. See Van Harten, supra note 167, at 264-70; Americo R. Cinquegrana, Note,
Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87 HARv. L. REv. 976, 983

(1974) ("Compared to his executive counterpart, the judicial officer may indeed be less wellinformed in the foreign security context than in the domestic, because the relevant
information is likely to be secret, or, if not secret, because it is of a kind with which the
judicial officer has had little reason to concern himself.").
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their review of administrative detentions based on privileged evi17
dence disclosed only to the court. 1
In this sense, Israel is an interesting example because the review of detention cases is operated by a relatively limited number of
judges accustomed to adjudicating such matters. Pursuant to the legislation in this area, the power of review is given only to the presidents of the district courts and then, on appeal, to the justices of the
Israeli Supreme Court. 72 The lessons to be drawn from the Israeli
case-study are, however, complex, and there exists no thorough empirical research of the decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court in this
area. The published decisions of the court demonstrate examples of
petitions and appeals that were dismissed, usually after the court has
reviewed the classified evidence and was convinced by it. However,
it would not be accurate to take this as the only relevant factor for assessing the effectiveness of the role played by the court. Some studies show that, especially in national security cases, many petitions to
the Israeli Supreme Court are resolved through compromises that
give the petitioner a remedy under the shadow of potential judicial
intervention.1 73 In some cases Israeli courts have stated that they
would not approve the prolonging of detention in the absence of new
174
intelligence material provided by the security services.
171. See, e.g., HCJ 5897/07 Arug v. Military Judge [July 12, 2007], para. 5(2) (not
reported) (Justice Rubinstein stated: "We are fully aware of the limitations on the exposure
of privileged intelligence material, and we are not proposing to change the fundamentals of
the system. And yet, our opinion is, based on our experience in reviewing privileged
material in security-related cases, that the authorities have to make an effort to conduct an
investigation that will be substantial and will confront those investigated with as many
details as possible from the material against them.").
172. The Israeli Supreme Court includes, at maximum, fifteen justices. The number of
presidents of district courts in Israel reflect the number of courts of this instance-six.
173. See Yoav Dotan, Government Lawyers as Adjudicators: Pre-Petitionsin the High
Court of Justice Department 1990-1997, 35 ISR. L. REV. 453 (2001); Yoav Dotan, Judicial
Rhetoric, Government Lawyers and Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of
Justice during the Intifada, 33 LAW & Soc'y REV. 319 (1999).
174. See, e.g., HCJ 2286/09 Nashata v. Military Judge [Mar. 3, 2009] (not published).
This is a very short decision which reflects the practice of compromise in the shadow of the
judicial power of review. The decision reads as follows:
Following our comments, which came after the review of the classified
material, the attorney of respondents 2-3 [the Military Commander of the West
Bank and the General Security Services] that in the absence of new material in
the matter of the petitioner his detention will not be prolonged for another time.
After the announcement was made, the attorney of the petitioner stated that he
does not insist on the petition. The petition is thus removed.
This is a good example of judicial involvement that proved to be effective. See also HCJ
5809/08 Nachla v. The Judge of the Military Court of Appeals [2008] (not published)
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Repeat play by judges has the advantage of building expertise
but it creates a corresponding risk of "capture"; these actors may over
time favor state security services because of their continuing interaction and dependency on those services for information and effective
administration of judicial duties. 75 Much has been written about the
tendency of courts to be deferential to executive decisions in times of
emergency. 7 6 This deference can be understood as one particular
177
type of the capture problem (and needless to say that Korematsu
was, in essence, a security detention case). Secret hearings of any
sort mean that courts are unlikely to hear from independent experts,
and those they do hear from likely will be former state security officials. Moreover, secret hearings are by their nature shrouded in an
atmosphere that already reflects a security priority, and judges must
continually rely on the very security services they are overseeing for
information. 78 Some critics of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) believe its lack of transparency and reliance on
one-sided government presentation of information substantially weaken its ability to reign-in national security agencies, 79 though others
argue that FISC oversight provides a substantial check on govern(stating that the attorney representing the Military Commander announced that in the
absence of new material the decision to prolong the detention will be limited to an additional
two months, and the attorney of the petitioner announced that in these circumstances he does
not insist on his petition; accordingly, the petition was removed); HCJ 3291/09-B Joubran v.
Military Judge [2009] (not published) (recording a similar development-this time the
attorney of the petitioner updated the court that he was notified that in the absence of new
intelligence material the detention will not be prolonged for more than two months; again,
the petition was removed).
175. See Gus Van Harten, Weaknesses of Adjudication in the Face of Secret Evidence,
13 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 1 (2009).

176. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1042
(2004) ("[J]udges can display remarkable flexibility for the interim, while covering their
tracks with confusing dicta and occasional restrictive holdings"); MATTHEW C. WAXMAN,
FOUND. FOR LAW, JUSTICE AND SOC'Y, CAN COURTS BE "TRUSTED" IN NATIONAL SECURITY

CRISES? 1 (2009), http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/ Waxman.pdf ("Civil libertarians
meanwhile worry that courts are likely to show too much deference to the political branches,
at least until the moment of maximum perceived peril passes. Historically, courts have
tolerated significant executive liberty infringements during wartime or emergencies ... .
177. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
178. Seeid. at218.
179. Jameel Jaffer, Balancing Power in the U.S. Response to External Threats: NSA
Surveillance and GuantanamoDetention, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 361, 363 (2007) ("The FISA
court meets in secret, allows only the govermnent to appear before it, and does not ordinarily
publish its decisions."). The U.S. Government, however, argues that its high success rate
before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is attributable to professional care and
scrutiny within the executive branch. See Royce Lamberth, Intelligence on the FISA Court,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 18.
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ment intelligence activities, and that until recently the government
was too cautious in handling issues within the FISC's purview. 180
This risk of capture is not unique to the judicial management model,
but that system lacks formal checks against such subtle pull.
The special advocate model has a repeat playing component
as well, if it includes (like in the United Kingdom and Canada) a specialized bar of security-cleared advocates, but it is less likely to address systemic issues because special advocates owe a duty to a particular client, not the particular administrative regime as a whole.
One of the virtues of special advocates discussed earlier, is their focused attention toward the detained person whom they represent and
his case. Special advocates, whose authority derives from the administrative regime, will incline toward tactical decisions based on an individual suspect's best interests. 18' In contrast, the judicial management model is based on the assumption that courts can fulfill two
functions at the same time-both promoting arguments on behalf of
the detainee and also considering the overall evidence in a balanced
manner.
On the other hand, the special advocate may be less hindered
by fidelity to precedent, as tends to be the case in the judicial management model.182 A special advocate is therefore likely more free to
make risky and novel arguments. That is, the special advocates model has better potential for the development of bold or radical arguments on behalf of the detainee in individual cases. Over time, such
arguments may be critical to spurring institutional reform.
Although special advocates focus on their case at hand, the
model can also provide a system-wide form of oversight by challeng180. See RICHARD POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM 201 (Rowman and Littlefield,
2007).
181. It is worth noting here, however, a concern that special advocates might be
susceptible to the same sort of capture discussed above in terms of courts. Much less
attention has been dedicated in prior studies to the issue of attorney capture than to court or
agency capture, so only tentative thoughts can be offered here. However, attorneys can also
find themselves in the same trap as courts, especially if they are government lawyers, who
fulfill the function of a special advocate only for a limited period of time, and then proceed
to other government legal positions. In this regard, attention should be given also to the
question of the identity of special advocates and their career path.
182. See Van Harten, supra note 175, at 11 ("[U]nlike the individual's lawyer, the judge
must exercise restraint when probing the executive's evidence and argument in order to
protect the court's neutrality."); see also Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a
Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2
CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y & ETHICS J. 81, 81 (2003) (discussing a criminal defendant's

counsel as the only actor in the process whose duty is to focus completely on advocacy for
the individual).
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ing specific evidence. 83 One particular area in which this phenomenon has arisen is evidence allegedly derived from torture. As Baroness Hale explained in the British context discussed above:
[T]his House has ruled that such evidence is always
inadmissible, but has placed the burden of proving this
upon the person who wishes to challenge it .... It is
particularly difficult for a person subject to control order proceedings to do this. Devising a sufficient
means of challenging the evidence is an incentive to
the authorities to rely on better and more reliable
84
sources of intelligence.1
Even before a particular case reaches a court, therefore, the anticipated scrutiny by special advocates may provide the government
with greater motivation to police its interrogation practices. As Kent
Roach explains:
The provisions which allow special advocates to challenge secret intelligence on the basis that it is irrelevant, unreliable or obtained as a result of torture,
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment have a potential to put the whole process of intelligence gathering
on trial. Depending on the receptivity of the judges to
such claims, these provisions may have far-reaching
and perhaps unintended effects. They could be as important to the security certificate regime as the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is to the criminal
justice system. 185
Note, however, Roach's emphasis on the receptivity of judges to
these arguments, bringing us back to the point about the need to build
sufficient judicial expertise and confidence over time.
Having begun this section by noting that judicial management
186
and special advocates may naturally seem like opposing models, it
is worth considering further how they might be combined to achieve
183. As one commentator has noted, the lack of adversarial process dealing with
classified information in immigration cases has led to mistaken deportation because
"government lawyers did not endeavor to ensure the reliability of this evidence before
presenting it in court, instead basing their cases on information from prejudiced sources,
mistranslations, and rumors." Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A Global Approach to Secret Evidence:
How Human Rights Law Can Reform our Immigration System, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.

REv. 287,290 (2008).
184. M.B. v. Sec'y of State, [2007] UKHL 46, para. 73, [2008] 1 A.C. 440, 491
(emphasis added).
185. Roach, supra note 134, at 323.
186. See supra Part II.B.
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synergies or to better optimize the balance of fairness and intelligence protection. No doubt there are some tradeoffs between them.
The use of special advocates may relieve pressure on judges to scrutinize executive claims carefully and slow the accumulation of judicial expertise in national security matters. Alternatively, judicial
management might disincentivize courts from relying on special advocates and assuring adequate discovery for them. Perhaps, though,
some of these tensions could be relieved by sequencing the roles.
For example, special advocates could be relied upon at the discovery
stage, especially in aid of protecting the gist, whereas at the merits
stage of a detention hearing judges could play a managerial role. Or,
vice versa, judges could play a strong managerial role at the discovery phase and based on that assessment could appoint special advocates as deemed necessary.
IV.

U.S.

EXPERIMENTATION AND POSSIBLE REFORM

The United States has not institutionalized nor used widely either of the models discussed. However, the underlying issues have
taken on greater practical significance in recent years, especially after
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld-which called, in the case of a citizen-detainee,
for a "fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions
before a neutral decisionmaker" 8 7-and the Supreme Court's extension of its principals in Boumediene v. Bush-requiring a "meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that [a detainee] is being held pursuant
to 'the erroneous application or interpretation' of relevant law." 188
As already noted above, U.S. jurisprudence, like that of other
common law systems explored in this paper, includes a strong gist
baseline. 89 And like the other common law systems, the United
187. 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
188. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266 (2008) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
189. The gist baseline in the United States typically takes the form of the notice
requirement in an analysis of due process of law. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (stating that due process requires that a deprivation of life,
liberty or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case"). See generally Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267 (1975) (noting as a fundamental requirement notice of the grounds for a particular
administrative action, and also "the right to know the evidence on which the administrator
relies"). During the Cold War, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that due process required
that an individual petitioning for conscientious objector status be furnished with a gist or
resume of the evidence the government relied on. See Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S.
397 (1955); Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955) (noting that "if the registrant is
to present his case effectively ... he must be cognizant of all the facts"). More recently, in
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States has struggled to design effective supplements to the gist requirement. Recently it experimented with a variety of approaches to
handling secret evidence in detention hearings, some of them drawing heavily on elements of these models. This Part applies the insights of Part III to the U.S. case and offers principles to guide its institutional reform in tackling the secret evidence problem.
A.

CurrentPractice

The judicial management approach found in Israel generally
runs contrary to the American justice system's reliance on partydriven, adversarial advocacy to develop and question evidence. But
the recent Guantanamo detainee habeas cases following Boumediene,
where the Supreme Court delegated to district courts the task of
working out procedures for adjudicating habeas challenges, have put
district court judges in the position of developing rules and procedures for handling classified information. "We recognize," wrote the
Court, "that the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting
sources and methods of intelligence gathering; and we expect that the
District Court will use its discretion to accommodate this interest to
the greatest extent possible."' 190 At the time of this writing, district
courts considering Guantanamo habeas cases have developed procedures for allowing security-cleared private counsel to view at the discovery stage information to which the suspect is not allowed
access, 191 and in some cases, at the merits stage, some parts of hearings have been closed to the detainee, allowing instead his securitycleared counsel to participate. 92 The government may also initially
withhold materials it deems protected until counsel requests access to
them, acting as a further barrier to information. Although there have
not yet been reported instances in which cleared counsel has overtly
been denied access to key evidence, given the very nature of secret
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the plurality required that the core elements of natural justice not be
eroded, holding that "a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the government's actual assertions." 542 U.S. 507, 601 (2004).
190. See Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2276.
191. See, e.g., Case Mgmt. Order, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442,
2008 WL 4858241, para. I(F) (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008).
192. See. e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, Civil Case No. 04-1166, slip op. at 9-10 (D.D.C.
Nov. 20, 2008) (rejecting classified information relied upon by the government as
insufficiently reliable); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing
classified portions of the proceeding in which counsel for both parties presented arguments
and evidence, without the detainee present).
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evidence it is difficult to ascertain whether there have been habeas
cases that the detainee would have won but for evidence withheld
from him.
As for a formalized special advocate model, the United States
has also legislated a form of that approach in a narrow context,
though that system has never been used. Following the Oklahoma
City bombings, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 which created the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC) 1 93 In removal proceedings where providing an
alien suspected of terrorism with unclassified summaries of secret
evidence might jeopardize national security, the statute allows the
government to conduct ATRC proceedings without providing such a
summary. 94 If the resident alien before the ATRC enjoys the status
of lawful and permanent resident, the alien may request a special attorney to observe and cross-examine the actual secret evidence on his
behalf.195 The special counsel is granted full access to the secret evidence and participates in any in camera procedures where the secret
evidence is relied upon, including cross-examination of the government's witnesses. 196
While no consistent approach has been institutionalized, neither is there consistency about the core policy values-participation
versus accuracy versus systemic regulation-in American national
security and due process jurisprudence. While the jurisprudence relies on language that suggests a focus on accuracy, the underlying
logic points to a concern with all three due process objectives, with
court holdings reflecting varying emphases among them.
Modern procedural due process doctrine expressly emphasizes accuracy as the primary value to a suspect. As a matter of U.S.
constitutional law, the issues in this paper are generally treated as
procedural due process questions.1 97 The key doctrinal formulation
then comes from Mathews v. Eldridge, where the Supreme Court
held that:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by
193.

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37

(2009)).

194. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(E)(ii), (D)(iii).
195. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E)(i), (F)(i).
196. David A. Martin, GraduatedApplication of ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Aliens:
The Real MeaningofZadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SuP. CT. REv. 47, 135 (2001).
197. Except, as noted near the outset, in criminal proceedings, which also implicate the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
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the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 198
On its face this formula seems purely utilitarian, aimed at reducing
the likelihood of error and appreciative of administrative costs to error reduction. 199 In other words, it appears concerned predominantly
with accuracy. To the extent that notice of the factual basis upon
which liberty deprivation is threatened and an opportunity for rebuttal remain critical elements of basic due process, recent Supreme
Court holdings have emphasized their value in promoting accura0
cy. 20
American due process jurisprudence about accuracy tends
mostly to focus on a particular type of accuracy, and that is minimization of "false positives," or erroneous deprivations of liberty, as
opposed to minimization of both false positives and negatives (erroneous grants of liberty) combined. Consider Wilkinson v. Austin,
which concerned the procedures employed in Ohio for determining
which inmates should be subject to maximum security prisons where
"inmates are deprived of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli
and of almost all human contact. ' 20 ' The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the processes Ohio used, which involved a number of
checks and opportunities for individual rebuttal, were sufficient. Although the Court recognized that the maximum security prisons were
designed to "separate the most predatory and dangerous prisoners
from the rest of the.. . general prison population" 202 and to deal with
"the danger that high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials and to
other prisoners," 203 its analysis of the risk of error and additional safeguards' effectiveness did not consider the potential risk of false
negatives. 204 Rather, the Court only considered the "significance of
198. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
199. See Mashaw, supra note 138, at 895.
200. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 226 (2005) ("Our procedural due process

cases have consistently observed that [notice and opportunity for rebuttal] are among the
most

important

procedural

mechanisms

for [the]

purposes

of avoiding

erroneous

deprivations.").
201. Id. at214.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 224.

204. To be fair, it is not so surprising in this case that the Court did not comment on the
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the inmate's interest in avoiding erroneous placement" 20 5 and the
value to the inmate of additional procedural safeguards. Wilkinson is
interesting for another reason, in that it involved a process that relies
sometimes on confidential informants whose protection in the prison
20 6
environment required anonymity.
The utilitarian nature of American procedural due process
analysis has been criticized from many quarters, and in practice it has
often turned on conceptions of fairness, drawing upon the dignity
concerns that historically underlay due process. Sometimes this is
overt, as when courts interpret due process as requiring "fundamental
fairness. ' 20 7 Other times it seems that issues of fairness are masked
as issues of accuracy, and processes seen as fair are simply assumed
to be accuracy-enhancing. In his dissent in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Service of Durham, for example, which held due process did
not require counsel assistance at a parental termination hearing, Justice Stevens stressed that "the reasons supporting the conclusion that
[due process] entitles the defendant in a criminal case to representation by counsel apply with equal force to a case of this kind. The issue is one offundamentalfairness," not of balancing costs and benefits. 208
Those fundamental fairness concerns hearken back to Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.20 9 In his concurring
opinion in that case, Justice Frankfurter emphasized that in the case

false negative problem, given that no one seemed to doubt that the prison policy at issue was
an aggressive one.
205. Id. at 225.
206. Id. at 227-28. Similarly but in another context, the Court in Lassiter v.
Department of Social Service of Durham, examining the due process required at a parental
termination hearing, focused its analysis on the risk of false positives, even though the Court
recognized that the State "shares the parent's interest in an accurate and just decision" given
the "urgent interest in the welfare of the child" involved. 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). The
Lassiter Court phrased the inquiry of error as "the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions" rather than erroneous deprivations. Id. However, in examining the
procedures currently employed by the State, the Court focused on their efficacy in reducing
the risk that a parent would be erroneously deprived of their child. See id. at 29.
207. The fundamental fairness test was first developed in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973), and continues to be used in the immigration context. See Nimrod Pitsker, Due
Processfor All: Applying Eldridge to Require Appointed Counselfor Asylum Seekers, 95
CAL. L. REv. 169, 176 (2007).
208. 452 U.S. at 60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). In Medina v. California,
505 U.S. 437 (1992), the Court rejected the use of Mathews to determine the
constitutionality of procedures in the criminal context.
209. 341 U.S. 123 (1951). See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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of "a person in jeopardy of serious loss," one must
be given "notice
''
of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. 210
Cases dealing with the use of secret evidence in immigration
contexts exhibit a mixture of due process values, lacking clarity of
priorities. The most detailed discussion is found in American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, in which the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's injunction against the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's (INS) use of undisclosed classified information allegedly linking two nonimmigrant and permanent resident
aliens to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 21' The
INS had used this undisclosed classified evidence to deny them legalization. In applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, 2 12 the
court criticized reliance on secret, undisclosed evidence on both accuracy and fairness grounds.
As for accuracy, the court stated: "There is no direct evidence
in the record to show what percentage of decisions utilizing undisclosed classified information result in error; yet, as the district court
below stated, 'One would be hard pressed to design a procedure more
likely to result in erroneous deprivations.' 21 3 It also framed its concerns in broader terms of regulating coercive state powers beyond the
case at hand by ensuring careful scrutiny of their application: "Without any opportunity for confrontation, there is no adversarial check
'214
on the quality of the information on which the INS relies.
As for fairness, the court then went on to say that "[a]lthough
not all rights of criminal defendants are applicable to the civil context, the procedural due process notice and hearing requirements have
'ancient roots' in the rights to confrontation and crossexamination. ' 21 5 It then quoted the Supreme Court's statement in
Greene v. McElroy:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable
in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and
210. Id. at 171-72.
211. 70F.3d 1045 (9thCir. 1995).

212. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For an explanation of the balancing test see supra note
198 and accompanying text.
213.

70 F.3d. at 1069 (citations omitted); see also Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13

(D.D.C. 1992) (holding that a lawful permanent resident with alleged ties to the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine could not be excluded based on secret evidence because
there would be no procedural safeguards against the possibility that the confidential
information was erroneous).
214. 70 F.3d at 1069.
215.

Id.
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the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's
case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has
216
an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
"As judges," the Ninth Circuit continued, "we are necessarily wary of
one-sided process: '[D]emocracy implies respect for the elementary
rights of men ... and must therefore practice fairness; and fairness
can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts de217
cisive of rights."'
B.

Lessonsfor PossibleReforms

Against this doctrinal backdrop, the U.S. Government is currently weighing anti-terrorism detention law reform options. Immediately after assuming office, President Obama announced the formation of an interagency task force to recommend options for future
U.S. detention policy and legal reforms. 218 In his May 2009 address
about Guantanamo and national security, the President pledged to
work with Congress on appropriate legislation for imperative detention needs, perhaps including prolonged detention without trial for
certain terrorism suspects, 219 though at the time of this writing the
Obama administration appears to have backed away from any intention to seek new detention legislation. 220 Meanwhile, district courts

216.

Id. (quoting 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)).

Greene was a Defense Department

contractor engineer who lost his security clearance on the basis of secret testimony
concerning his ex-wife's association with Communists. In light of the constitutional
concerns raised, the Court held that no administrative action to restrict the scope of due
process for national security reasons could be taken without explicit authorization from
Congress or the President.
217. Id. (quoting Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (D.N.J.

1999) (holding, in a case challenging deportation, that "the INS's reliance on secret evidence
raises serious issues about the integrity of the adversarial process, the impossibility of selfdefense against undisclosed charges, and the reliability of government processes initiated
and prosecuted in darkness").
218.

See Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 22, 2009).

219. See Remarks by the President on National Security at the National Archives,
Washington, D.C., (May 21, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/).
220. See Peter Finn, Administration Won't Seek New Detention System, WASH. POST,
Sept. 24, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/09/23/AR2009092304427.html.
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considering Guantanamo habeas cases are working through these is221
sues in the course of litigation.
One of the critical and most sensitive issues the executive
branch, the Congress and the courts will confront as part of this
reform effort is how to handle protection of classified evidence that
cannot be disclosed to terrorism suspects. Many of the reform proposals that scholars or other policy advocates have put forward contain elements of the two models analyzed above. A number of scholars have, for example, proposed a special advocate mechanism for
U.S. terrorist detention hearings, perhaps as part of a new "national
security court" or to help administer a new preventive or administra222
tive detention statute.
One feature shared by common law democracies is the dynamic interplay between courts, the legislature and the executive in
working through these issues. The analysis of the models discussed
and the experience accumulated from their operation point to several
insights that should guide these legal reform efforts.
First, the experience of other common law democracies has
been a recent strengthening of the baseline gist requirement. While
this may not seem so surprising, it is significant in light of a generally
perceived increase in terrorism threat-along with a heightened need
to develop and protect sensitive intelligence--during the past decade,
which might be expected to call into question or water down this approach. In the recent British case applying the ECHR's ruling
upholding the gist requirement, Lord Hoffman warned that "the decision of the [ECHR] ... may well destroy the system of control orders
which is a significant part of this country's defences against terrorism," before acknowledging that "[n]evertheless, I think that your
Lordships have no choice to submit" to the ECHR's ruling. 223 Lord
Hope also remarked:
The consequences of a successful terrorist attack are
likely to be so appalling that there is an understandable wish to support the system that keeps those who
are considered to be most dangerous out of circulation
for as long as possible. But the slow creep of compla-

221.
A3 1.
222.

See Chisun Lee, Their Own Private Guatnanamo, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term Terrorist Detention and Our National

Security Court (Brookings Inst., Working Paper, Feb. 4, 2009), available at http:/
www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0209-detention__goldsmith/0209detention-goldsmith.pdf.
223. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. AF [2009] UKHL 28, para. 84.
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cency must be resisted. If the rule of law is to mean
anything, it is in cases such as these that the court
must stand by principle. It must insist that the person
224
affected be told what is alleged against him.

Often, even those scholars or commentators who propose expansive
U.S. government terrorist detention authorities regard the protective
225
floor of a gist requirement as a critical requirement of legitimacy.
If the cases and models studied herein point to a strengthening
gist requirement-both nationally and in the transnational levelthey also point to secondary doctrinal and institutional issues that
each system faces. Doctrinally, especially the recent European and
British cases reveal the difficulty courts have had in determining
where to draw the lines of the gist-what is the bare minimum content of an allegation? Little scholarly attention has been devoted to
this issue, and courts have tended to address it with largely conclusory statements. Another important issue concerns the need to apply
the concept of minimum "gist" disclosure not only to information
that justifies the detention decision, but also to information that is
beneficial to the detainee and may assist him in rebutting the allegations against him. From a practical perspective, however, it is difficult to enforce this principle, since security services may not come
forward with all relevant material, and it is very hard to define the
contours of the information relevant for disclosure in a specific case
(e.g. should it include information on recruitment practices of a terrorist organization, which may shed light on the case but is not expressly connected to it).
To the extent the gist is defined in terms of helping to rebut
an allegation, courts cannot completely divorce analysis of the gist
itself from the other institutional mechanisms that operate along with
it, including special advocates or inquisitorial scrutiny of evidence by
judges. Moreover, those proposing reforms, and courts charged with
administering them, must be conscious of and guard against subtle
tradeoffs among mechanisms designed to supplement each other. Introducing a mechanism of a special advocate can contribute to reform
by bolstering fairness in all of its senses, with some potential contribution to pushing toward more disclosure. However, it is important
to protect core disclosure requirements from dilution that may result
from perceptions that special advocates obviate their necessity.
224. Id. para. 79.
225. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 222, at 12 ("The ex parte approach serves the
compelling government interest in preserving the secrecy of sensitive intelligence

information, but it seems illegitimate to detain someone without letting him or at least his
representative know about and contest the evidence.").
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Those contemplating institutional reform must be mindful of the dynamic interplay of procedural mechanisms and the pressures and incentives facing judges and security services alike.
A further lesson from the above analysis is the need to consider the application of competing models or other reforms in the
context of other institutional features, such as the relationship between judicial management and judicial specialization, perhaps acquired through centralizing proceedings in a single court or set of
courts. A number of scholars proposing detention law reforms for
the United States have emphasized the utility of centralizing judicial
review of terrorist detention hearings in one court (perhaps an existing, generalist court such as the D.C. District Court), which would
acquire additional expertise in security and intelligence matters over
time.2 26 To those who see it as successful, France's counterterrorism
effort is sometimes credited in part to its development of a specialized, centralized terrorism court, because it allowed its magistrates
to become "the type of expert on the subject of terrorism that is difficult to create within normal judicial institutions. ' 227 Israel serves as a
less extreme model in this regard, since the judges who specialize in
judicial review of detentions in Israeli law are part of the regular
judicial system. This example may be more relevant to the United
States than that of a completely separate specialized court, which is
more common within the continental tradition of specialized courts in
other substantive areas.
226. See, e.g., Andrew C. McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, We Need a National Security
Court (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 156, 2006), available
at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090820-Chapter6.pdf; Amos N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan:
Creatinga Hybrid Paradigmfor the Detention of Terrorists,19 FLA. J. INT'L. L. 511 (2007);
Goldsmith, supra note 222. Other scholars have proposed expanding the jurisdiction of the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to handle detention cases, since it already has judges
with expertise in handling sensitive intelligence matters and mechanisms to ensure secrecy.
See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF
TERROR 18, 51-52 (MIT Press 2005); STEPHANIE COOPER BLUM, THE NECESSARY EVIL OF
PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR (Cambria Press 2008).
227. Jeremy Shapiro & Benedicte Suzan, The French Experience of Counter-terrorism,
45 SURVIVAL 67, 78 (2003); see also ANTOINE GARAPON, Is THERE A FRENCH ADVANTAGE IN
THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM? 5-6 (Real Institute Elcano 2005), available at
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/807/Garapon807.pdf.
For a critique of French
counter-terrorism laws and courts, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREEMPTING JUSTICE:
COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND PROCEDURES IN FRANCE (2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/
reports/2008/07/01/preempting-justice. The Constitution Project appears to take issue with
this view in arguing against national security courts that "unlike tax and patent law, there is
simply no highly specialized expertise that would form relevant selection criteria for the
judges." THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, A CRITIQUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS 3 (2008),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critique-of the NationalSecurityCourts.pdf.
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Finally, any effort to craft appropriate institutions and procedures for handling secret evidence must confront the issue of due
process values and the relative priority among accuracy, dignity and
systemic regulation. Again, mediation of these values and priorities-as in all common law democracies-will often involve dialogue between courts and the political branches. Most of the time,
these priorities will align rather than trade off. But the choice among
mechanisms for handling secret evidence will likely favor some values more than others and will reflect at least implicit views, which
will likely remain beyond empirical testing, about effectiveness in
rooting out factual truth.
V.

CONCLUSION

The use of secret evidence is seen in different systems as a
necessary feature of decisions to limit liberties of terrorism suspects.
The main analytic challenge is to transcend the simplistic divide between those who oppose the use of secret evidence under all circumstances and those who would justify non-disclosure in the name of national security in a sweeping manner. This Article has done so by
trying to map existing experience in this area into three ideal models-a model based on a disclosure of the "gist" of the evidence (but
not more than that), a model based on full disclosure to the court
(judicial governance) and a model based on disclosure to special advocates (who are different from the person's lawyers and are prohibited from communicating the information to the individual involved). Experience shows that, in practice, the models are used in
forms that are not always as clear and precise as their ideal prototypes. Yet, we have stressed their ideal forms as analytic tools for
thinking about possible reform in this area, especially in the U.S.
context.
Reforms in this area can also experiment with new combinations among the various models. In fact, as we have shown, some
degree of combination is already part of current practice-the
core/gist model serves as a baseline in all the systems we have reviewed, and the question is what additional mechanisms should be
added to it: judicial governance or special advocates. At the same
time, it is not obvious that all combinations are possible or even desirable. We have pointed out that sometimes additional safeguards
serve as justifications for pressing the basic preliminary condition of
substantive (albeit partial) disclosure to the individual himself, which
we accept for the purposes of this analysis as a first priority. Similarly, a proposal to combine the special advocate model and the judicial
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governance model (a combination that may seem desirable at first
glance to augment protections) should not be considered a simple solution--especially remembering that part of the justification for the
judicial governance model in the first place has traditionally been
lack of other protections. It is possible that judges will lose legitimacy if they aspire to play an active role in reviewing secret evidence in
a system in which special advocates are in place.
In the end, any effort to craft appropriate institutions and procedures for handling secret evidence must confront the issue of prioritizing the multiple values underlying due process and craft mechanisms that harmonize with the other features of national court
systems.

